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This thesis attempts to review evidence supporting a 
positive error-reaction time correlation in category 
verification tasks. All reviewed models predict that 
categorization errors will increase when the time needed to 
make a membership judgement increases. This is explained 
either as a result of the structure of categories (e.g., as 
another manifestation of category fuzziness), or as a 
product of the category verification process (e.g., 
attributed in general memory models to the random nature of 
the retrieval process). Two specific models that attempt to 
explain the correlation were tested. One that assumes the 
correlation is the result of incomplete or inconsistent 
concept retrieval when subjects are under speed emphasis 
conditions, and other that assumes the correlation is not a 
psychological phenomenon, but the result of grouping data 
across subjects (the common data gathering procedure in the 
field). Results support this latter explanation of the 
error-reaction time correlation. It is shown that if the 
effect of intersubject disagreement in category membership 
judgements over errors is statistically controlled, the 
correlation significantly decreases for both categories 
used. The reduction in the calculated correlation is such 
that for one category (furniture) the magnitude of the 
effect is not significantly different from zero, and for the 
other (vehicle) it accounts for a mere 6% of the variance of 
categorization errors. The implications for models of 
category membership decisions are discussed, and a two stage 
model of the process that does not predict the correlation 
(but that can explain its rise when accumulated data is 
used) is suggested. 
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This thesis will be an examination of the nature of 
concepts, and of the cognitive processes involved in making 
lexical decisions. By lexical decisions I will understand 
basically two types of tasks: (a) the word-nonword task 
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(also called same-different), in which subjects are asked to 
decide if two letter-strings are both the same (both words 
or both non-words) or different; and (b) a straightforward 
instance-category task, in which subjects are asked to 
decide if a given word belongs or not to a category (e.g., 
is a robin a bird?). This latter type, which will be called 
category verification, is the task that will be of greater 
importance throughout this thesis. 
Regarding the nature of concepts the main issues 
revolve around how should concepts be represented (e.g., 
dimensions, independent features, or theories), and if their 
representations (whatever that turns out to be) produce 
categories with sharp boundaries (where any instance falls 
clearly in or outside a category) or fuzzy boundaries (where 
some instances clearly belong to a category, but others are 
unclear). 
The elucidation of the category verification process 
involves several dichotomies: (a) is the process 
deterministic or probabilistic?; (b) is the process done in 
a single stage or is it possible to discriminate two or more 
stages?; and (c) is information continually accumulated or 
is it available only at discrete moments? 
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One of the most general findings throughout the 
literature is that there is a positive correlation between 
reaction time and error rate (subjects tend to make more 
errors on decisions that take more time). This can be 
interpreted as a result of categories with fuzzy limits, 
where errors and slow reaction times are the result on cases 
that are unclear. However, an alternative explanation is 
viewing the correlation as a result of process 
characteristics. Within this last interpretation, specific 
experiments will be outlined that will help to determine if 
the reported error-reaction time correlation is the result 
of changes in a hypothetical coding stage. In a process 
requiring a working definition to be produced each time 
category membership has to be verified, the coding stage 
would be the stage where, taking into account task 
characteristics, that category definition is constructed. 
The critical independent variable will be developing an 
agreed-upon definition of a category with the subject, based 
on the idea that this procedure should prevent changes in 




The problem of what type of model of cognitive 
representation of category knowledge is supported by what we 
know about different types of performances on lexical 
decision tasks, has two intermingled aspects. On one hand 
we have the models themselves. On the other hand, we have 
the problem of deciding what is a valid interpretation of 
the experimental results, specially when reaction time is 
used as the dependent variable. 
Categorization 
Categorization has been thought of as one of the most 
basic cognitive processes, directly related or based on our 
notion of similarity. As Quine puts it: "There is nothing 
more basic to thought and language than our sense of 
similarity; our sorting of things into kinds" (Quine, 1969, 
p. 116). The problem with the notion of similarity as an 
explanation of categorization phenomena, is that it is too 
unconstrained (Medin, 1989). Therefore, in a general sense 
this review can be seen as a look at how different theories 
define similarity when meaningful lexical stimuli are used. 
Reaction Times 
Reaction time is used as a dependent variable all 
across cognitive psychology. According to Meyer, Irwin, 
Osman, and Kounios (1988), "In representative issues of the 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, up to 40% of the articles used measures of 
reaction time to reach their conclusions. Substantial 
percentages . may also be found in other related 
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publications" (p. 183). The rationale behind this is that 
"If the processing of information by the mind is highly 
structured, as most psychologists believe, then different 
paths through that structure will entail different time 
courses, and those differences will be reflected in response 
times" (Luce, 1986, p. 1). The same general definition 
applies in the particular case of performing a lexical 
decision task: it is assumed that reaction time is a 
function of the process complexity, and that when more steps 
are involved in the process of solving the lexical decision 
task, more time is required. 
The problem that researchers face is that, as will be 
shown throughout this review, there is no way of 
interpreting reaction times without making additional 
assumptions, so the interpretations will always look 
something like the following statement: if the process has~ 
characteristics (generally assumptions of independence, e.g. 
that processing stages are independent, or that features to 
be checked throughout the process are independent), then the 
obtained reaction time distribution can be interpreted in 
such and such a way. In practical terms this means that 
reaction time data can support, with the proper assumptions, 
several interpretations. Again, in a general sense this 
review can be seen as a look at how different theories 
explain reaction time distributions when subjects perform 
lexical decisions. 
Requirements for a Theory of Categorization 
A theory of categorization attempts to present a model 
that explains how people construct, represent and use 
categories. The typical task that has been used is a 
category verification task, in which the person is asked to 
decide if a given target word belongs or not to a certain 
category (e.g., if a robin is a bird). 
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A representative list and a general characterization of 
relevant phenomena that a theory should explain in relation 
to category verifications will be provided. This should 
also serve as an introduction to the topics and concepts 
that will be reappearing in greater detail later on: 
1. People are able to judge the degree in which two 
word meanings are similar. 
2. People are able to judge if a target word is a 
member or a non-member of a given category; and people are 
able to change their membership judgements when hedges are 
used. Hedges are words like technically speaking, or 
loosely speaking (e.g., loosely speaking, is a skateboard a 
vehicle?). 
3. People judge some members of the category to be 
more typical than others. 
4. When on a given category verification task, 
reaction times are recorded and averaged for each target 
word across subjects, reaction time data show a 
characteristic skewed pattern. Also mean reaction time is 
positively correlated with reaction time variance. 
5. Typicality is negatively correlated with reaction 
time. 
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6. Under conditions where speed is required, in 
trading accuracy for speed (Speed-Accuracy Trade-off or SAT) 
people are more prone to make categorization errors in cases 
that are less typical. It follows that there is a positive 
error-reaction time correlation. 
7. Decisions can be primed by providing subjects with 
information immediately before the decision is made. This 
will produce in general faster reaction times, but on some 
cases it will actually increase reaction time. 
In the following review a distinction is made between 
structural and process theories, and subsequently between 
deterministic and probabilistic process theories. The 
distinctions are not clear-cut on all cases since some 
theories (e.g., Spreading Activation, Feature Comparison) do 
make both structural and process assumptions, but it seems 
that structural theories emphasize relations between a word 
and some form representation, and all dependent variables 
are explained by the structural properties that allow the 
decision to be made; whereas process theories make specific 
statements about the time course of the decision process, 
and dependent variables are explained by this process. 
Furthermore, not all these categorization theories equally 
succeed in explaining various phenomena. For example 
membership judgements, priming, typicality, and hedges can 
be handled through structural or deterministic process 
theories; while specific features of reaction time 
distributions, Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off (SAT), and error to 
reaction time (RT from now on) correlation can be better 
handled by a probabilistic process theory. 
Structural Theories 
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The following theories are all structural and the 
variables typically under study occur in classification 
tasks which involve similarity ratings. There is little 
worry about the computational or dynamic process, so errors 
and RTs are seen as a function of structural properties such 
as distance in a semantic network. 
Dimensional Approach 
The basic assumption of the dimensional or geometric 
approach is that meaning can be understood as the relative 
position of a word in a space of n dimensions, or as 
Fillenbaum and Rapoport put it, "The meaning of a lexical 
item is a function of the set of meaning relations which 
hold between that item and other items in the same domain" 
(Fillenbaum & Rapoport, 1971, p. 3). Dependent variables 
such as RT are viewed as a function of the distance between 
the items in the subjective lexicon. 
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There are many ways in which the semantic distance 
between words can be estimated. One common way is to 
define semantic distance using common-sense relations 
holding between words. Thus, for example, Schaeffer and 
Wallace (1970) simply asserted that canary and bird are 
semantically more similar or close than canary and animal 
since the members of the first pair share more meaning 
components (e.g., feathered, fly, are winged, lay eggs) than 
the second pair. A more direct way of estimating the 
semantic distance is to have subjects themselves judge the 
semantic distance between words. This approach, together 
with the appropriate scaling techniques (e.g., clustering 
and multidimensional scaling), has been used by several 
authors to explore the s~mantic structure of a certain 
domain (Fillenbaum & Rapoport, 1971; Miller, 1969). 
Fillenbaum and Rapoport set themselves to explore the 
semantic structures of several domains (such as color names, 
pronouns, and verbs of judging) applying procedures such as 
multidimensional scaling, and clustering techniques to 
symmetric arrays of proximity measures between all pairs of 
lexical items drawn from a specific semantic domain. 
These subjective structures and the associated 
distances between words have been used to predict various 
kinds of language performance (Henley, 1969; Hutchinson & 
Lockhead, 1977; Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Rumelhart & 
Abrahamson, 1973). For example, Rumelhart and Abrahamson 
(1973) hypothesized that subjects can operate upon elements 
with a multidimensional representation using the Euclidean 
distances between elements as directed vectors, hence the 
task of solving the analogy "C is to~ as A is to B" would 
be equivalent to the form "Find~ such that the vector AB 
is equal to the vector c~." Employing Henley's (1969) 
mammal configuration and Luce's choice model (Luce, 1959), 
the probability of each analogy completion alternative was 
successfully predicted. 
Other studies have been directed to the prediction of 
RT and errors (variables that will be critical in our 
discussion later on) from semantic distance. The basic 
approach has been described by Hutchinson and Lockhead 
(1977) in the following manner" . if two stimuli are 
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highly similar, they are frequently confused (errors), and 
the latency to identify the particular form presented in an 
absolute judgement task is relatively long" (Hutchinson & 
Lockhead, 1977, p. 660). Similarity means that their 
Euclidean distance on then dimensional space that has been 
obtained for that particular domain, is small. Smith and 
Rips (Rips et al., 1973; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) 
obtained separate multidimensional representations for each 
of two separate sets of animal terms (birds and mammals). 
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The two solutions were each interpretable in two dimensional 
spaces where the dimensions could be labeled as size and 
ferocity. The Euclidean distances between points in the 
respective spaces (e.g., hawk-cardinal, lion-mammal) were 
then used to predict reaction times in several 
categorization experiments. Generally, it was found that 
semantic distances accounted for a statistically significant 
proportion of the variation in RT, even though in many tasks 
the amount of variance attributable to variations in 
semantic distance can be extremely small (Caramazza, Hersh, 
& Torgeson, 1976), as shown by reported correlations between 
logRT and semantic distance as low as -.17. Caramazza et 
al. (1976) explain the wide difference in RT-semantic 
distance correlations that are obtained depending on the 
category tested, as the result of two factors: the type of 
task, and the relative familiarity of the material tested. 
In the first case there are tasks that may move the subject 
into an associative meaning strategy, such as using 
relations among words that, strictly speaking, are not 
relevant to a definition of the word. Second, the fact that 
some categories are less familiar than others for the 
typical experimental subject (e.g., less is known about fish 
than about mammals), can account for the difference in RT to 
semantic distance correlations among categories, by way of a 
reduction in the similarity rating variance (actually by a 
reduction in the range of similarity values) 
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From Hutchinson and Lockhead's quote above and the 
discussion that follows, it is clear that for dimensional 
theories errors and RT are correlated because categories are 
defined by continuous dimensions, not by boundaries. There 
is a graded structure that allows errors on unclear cases. 
A central aspect of the spatial representation of 
meaning is that the distance between two elements is the 
same whether one moves from A to B or from B to A (e.g., 
from robin to bear or from bear to robin). Two problems 
have been found with this notion. Shoben (1976) found that 
in the same-different task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971)--
where a subject must decide if two letter-strings are both 
words or both nonwords--RTs for the A-B pair were different 
than those for the B-A pair. In fact, bird-mammal pairs were 
reliably faster than mammal-bird pairs (Shoben, 1976). Even 
though these asymmetries had been attributed to response 
bias (Tversky & Gati, 1978), Shoben extended the Feature 
Comparison Model (Smith et al., 1974)--which I will review 
later on--to account for the asymmetry through process 
characteristics, not structural properties. 
Departing from a spatial representation, but still 
within a structural framework, Tversky (Tversky, 1977; 
Tversky & Gati, 1978) was able to account for a more general 
type of asymmetry through a feature-theoretical approach. 
In contrast to the temporal asymmetry found by Shoben, 
Tversky's asymmetry relates to the problem of anisotropy of 
12 
the semantic space, which precludes the use of Euclidean 
distance as a measure of similarity. I will begin reviewing 
the feature comparison approach by examining Tverky's 
contrast theory. 
The basic idea behind all featural approaches is that 
similarity is the result of a process that searches for 
matching qualitative features, in contrast to dimensions 
which are quantitative. 
Contrast Theory 
In this approach, each object~ is characterized by a 
set of features, denoted A, and the observed similarity of a 
to Q denoted s{a,b), is expressed as a linear combination of 
their common and distinctive features. 
S{a,b) = 8f{A n B) - af(A - B) - Bf(B - A). 
where 8,a,B >= 0 
The model is formulated in terms of the parameters 
(0,a,B) that characterize the task (emphasis on common 
features, features that are in~ that are not in Q, or 
features that are in Q that are not in~, in that same 
order), and the scale 1, which reflects the salience or 
prominence of the various features, thus measuring the 
contribution of any particular feature to the similarity 
between objects. The factors that contribute to the 
( 1) 
salience of a stimulus include: intensity, frequency, 
familiarity, good form, and informational content. 
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This model will predict the appearance of an asymmetry 
in similarity juqgements, specifically, that "the variant is 
more similar to the prototype than vice versa" (Tversky, 
1977, p. 328), whenever (A - B) is more or less salient than 
(B - A). Using a task in which subjects were asked to 
assess the similarity of pairs of countries (e.g, Belgium-
Luxembourg), Tversky was able to produce an asymmetry of 
judgement as predicted by the model. Pairs of countries 
were constructed so that one member of the pair was 
considerably more prominent than the other (e.g., 
India-Ceylon), and people were asked to rate the similarity 
between pairs on a scale from 1 (no similarity) to 20 
(maximal similarity). For one group the less prominent 
member was presented first, and for the other group the 
order of presentation was reversed. 
The finding that similarity judgements can be altered 
by some of Tversky's parameters (e.g., salience, and 
emphasis), is interpreted as evidence that there is no 
unitary concept of similarity, rather "a wide variety of 
similarity relations" (Tversky & Gati, 1978, p. 97). This 
is probably the strongest argument against a dimensional 
representation as a psychological theory of meaning. 
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Tverky's findings can be accounted for through what has 
turned out to be one of the most influential theories about 
categories: Family Resemblance. 
Family Resemblance 
Many natural categories can be structured as a 
hierarchy. A hierarchy will have a vertical dimension with 
superordinate, ordinate, and subordinate levels; and a 
horizontal dimension with separate categories at the same 
level. 
The best example is a taxonomy. In the vertical 
dimension of categories of concrete objects (e.g., moving up 
and down in a taxonomy), there is generally one level of 
abstraction (understanding by abstraction within a taxonomy, 
a particular level of inclusiveness) at which the most basic 
category cuts can be made; concrete objects at this level of 
the taxonomy are called by Rosch, basic-level objects 
(Rosch, 1978). She found that 11 • • this is the most 
inclusive level at which category members (1) are used, or 
interacted with, by similar motor actions, (2) have similar 
perceived shapes and can be imagined, (3) have identifiable 
humanly meaningful attributes, (4) are categorized by young 
children, and (5) have linguistic primacy (in several 
senses) 11 (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 169). To 
illustrate this point, let us imagine a small taxonomy, 
where living things is the superordinate, flower is the 
basic-level object, and roses and lilacs are the 
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subordinates. Flower would then be the most inclusive level 
at which conditions 1 through 5 are met. 
In the horizontal dimension of categories, Rosch 
follows the Wittgensteinian notion that most, if not all, 
categories have what has been called fuzzy boundaries (a 
direct consequence of not having a core, or a set of 
necessary defining features), and that this is handled by 
the user of natural languages by leaving aside the question 
of category boundaries and placing emphasis on their clear 
cases. The degree to which a case is considered typical of 
a given category is called degree of typicality, and the 
more typical of a category a member is judged, the more 
attributes it has in common with other members of the 
category and the fewer attributes in common with members of 
contrasting categories (Rosch, 1978). Categories thus 
consist of members having clusters of overlapping features 
that produce a family resemblance. 
It was found that the degree of typicality is related 
to virtually all of the major dependent variables used as 
measures in the area (Rosch, 1978). 
1. RT: in general the more typical of a category ya 
case~ is, the less time it takes to decide if the sentence 
"~ is a member of y" is true. 
2. Speed of learning and order of development: 
typicality predicts speed of learning, and good examples are 
learned before bad examples. 
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3. Order and probability of item output are correlated 
with typicality ratings. 
4. Priming: degree of typicality predicts whether 
advance information about the category name facilitates or 
inhibits responses in a matching task. 
5. Hedges: these are qualifying terms such as almost 
and virtually. When subjects were given sentence frames 
such as"~ is virtually y", they reliably placed the more 
typical member of the pair of items into the referent (y) 
slot (this is basically Tversky's asymmetry prediction). 
6. Substitubility into sentences: typicality ratings 
for membership of superordinate categories predicts the 
extent to which the member term is substitutable for the 
superordinate in sentences. 
Rosch states that when she speaks of the formation of 
categories, she means their formation in the culture, not 
their use or processing in the individual subject (Rosch, 
Simpson, & Miller, 1976), nor their representation (Rosch, 
1978), but a set of facts about judgements of degree of 
typicality and their relations with variables such as RT and 
others. In doing so she is advocating a kind of 
operationalist methodology, which centers on answering the 
question of how to characterize the phenomenon, rather 
than to propose a theory to explain it. Nevertheless it is 
difficult to maintain this separation once she introduces 
the concept of family resemblance as a model of the internal 
structure of categories, and uses it to explain typicality 
effects. 
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The basic idea is that since a category has no core or 
defining features, coherence arises because its members have 
more in common with other members of the category than with 
alternative categories, that is they share a family 
resemblance. Rosh and Mervis (1975) found that the same 
principle can also account for internal structure of natural 
categories, typical members of the category being those with 
more attributes in common with other members of the category 
and less attributes in common with other categories. Also, 
Rosch et al. (1976) found that the same effects could be 
produced with artificial categories (dot patterns, stick 
figures, and letter strings), where typicality was defined 
as similarity to a prototype described as possessing the 
mean or mode of the features of the category. From here it 
is only a step to saying that categories are cognitively 
represented by prototypes, but Rosch denies in several 
occasions that she should be interpreted in this way. 
The Effect of Interrelated Knowledge 
In models examined up to this point, and on others that 
I will examine later, features are assumed to be more or 
less independent from each other, their only relation being 
that they are all linked to the same word. What happens to 
one specific feature during processing will not affect the 
rest of the features, meaning that their probabilities of 
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being accessed are not conditional. This is very clear in 
dimensional theories in which independence of dimensions is 
a requisite. It is also clear in Contrast Theory, in which 
independence is a mathematical requisite. It is less clear 
in Spreading Activation, because once a feature node has 
been activated some nodes do become more accessible (those 
that are connected to the activated node) and others less 
(because of the requirement of limited total activation), 
but the contrary is not true: when a node does not become 
activated it does not necessarily decrease the activation of 
other nodes. 
The assumption of independence of features has had an 
effect on the postulated sources of typicality. Most 
theories assume that typicality increases or decreases as 
overall similarity to some form of internal representation 
varies, but they say nothing about the possibility of 
converging or conflicting evidence. Maybe an example about 
what is meant by converging or conflicting evidence is in 
order here: imagine a system that is checking for the 
features can fly and has feathers, and that those two 
features are not independent but related so that any time 
that you think of feathers you think of them as a means of 
flying. If both features are checked (in parallel or in 
sequence), and has feathers is rapidly found to be positive, 
this should aid checking can fly if it's positive and slow 
checking it if it's negative; something similar would happen 
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if has feathers is found to be false, in which case checking 
can fly would be aided if negative and slowed if positive. 
It seems that independence of features is a convenient 
but unrealistic assumption, and that it renders the 
explanation of typicality at least incomplete because it 
fails to represent intra- and inter-concept relations and 
more general world knowledge (Murphy & Medin, 1985). 
The independence assumption has been questioned by 
several researchers. Gati and Tversky (1984) found that 
independence was violated when qualitative and quantitative 
features occur in the same stimulus. Goldstone, Medin, and 
Gentner (1991) give an elegant example of how this occurs, 
which I will follow in the next lines. 
In Figure 1, a single physical feature was added (in 
this case a single square was added on each column) from a 
to b, so if features were independent, similarity judgements 
would have to remain the same. The fact is that there is an 
absolute shift in similarity judgements. In~ 89% of the 
subjects selected the two squares as the most similar, 
whereas in Q 100% selected the two circles plus a square. 
What happens is that in going from~ to Q, a qualitative 
relation was also added: two figures alike and one 
different. 
Goldstone et al. (1991) have shown that qualitative or 
relational features cannot be weighted the same as simple 
Figure 1. The effect of using a qualitative feature when 
making similarity judgements 
6 D 
(a) is like 
6 D 
6 D 









Note. From "Relational similarity and the nonindependence 
of judgements" by R. L. Goldstone, D. L. Medin, & D. 
Gentner, 1991, Cognitive Psychology, 23, p. 226. 
features, and that they have to be treated differently. 
Similarities of the same type mutually increase the weight 
of one another in similarity judgements, whereas 
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similarities of different types are less reinforcing or even 
inhibitory. 
Another way to take into account inter-feature 
relationships is through the notion of subjective theories. 
Medin and Murphy (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985) argue 
that the properties that distinguish concepts may be greatly 
determined by peoples' goals, which are linked to their 
theories about objects. According to them: "A concept may 
be invoked when it has sufficient explanatory relation to an 
object, rather than when it matches an object's attributes" 
(Murphy & Medin, 1985, p. 295). A theory would be a cluster 
of features that are related by structure-function 
relationships (e.g., feather-flying) or by causal schemata. 
Following this line of reasoning, it can be argued that if 
concepts are in fact theories about things, then they have a 
structure that is just as complex as that of scripts 
(Barsalou & Sewell, 1985). 
If this is an accurate account of categories, can it be 
thought that features are in some sense simpler than the 
concepts they are supposed to build? It seems not. As one 
extends the role of features as critical elements not only 
for categorization, but also for identification or 
recognition, one finds that because many proposed 
categorization features have to be functional, they cannot 
aid in recognition unless they themselves can be translated 
to physical features (Smith & Medin, 1981). Earlier Rosch 
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(1978) had noted that such features as chairs being sitable 
upon cannot aid in recognition since you must first 
recognize the object as a chair in order to assign the 
feature. If this analysis is correct, then it can be said 
that the features of the categorization process are as 
abstract as the concepts that they are supposed to build, 
and even seemingly physical features are rarely so, 
requiring many times functional knowledge. 
An example would be the definition of table. Has legs 
would be a feature that probably many people would use to 
define a table, but that feature itself is a concept as 
abstract as the concept it helps to define. What is common 
to a human leg, an elephant's leg, a bird's leg, and a 
table's leg? Probably there is no common physical feature; 
actually 1.§.g is better defined by its function of supporting 
a structure, and that cannot be deduced from purely physical 
features. In the case of tables it requires the knowledge 
(acquired through interactions with that type of objects) 
that tables are heavy and require support. Even a feature 
that we would agree is truly physical, like color, requires 
functional knowledge. When it is said that plants are 
green, what is really being said is that when observed under 
specific conditions (i.e., with daylight) they appear green 
to the observer. Then, when somebody says plants are green, 
he or she is saying if you take a plant and observe it with 
daylight, it will appear green to you, which is like having 
a theory about what are normal conditions for making 
observations in the color domain. It seems that this 
solution to the problem of physical features also points 
towards the idea that concepts, and features themselves 
embody subjective theories about the world. 
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Further evidence for the role of inter-feature 
relationships comes from a study done by Medin, Wattenmaker, 
and Hampson (1987). They find that in a task where people 
have to construct artificial categories, they tend to 
construct categories based on single dimensions, and it is 
only when features are causally connected, or inter-feature 
relationships are made salient that family resemblance 
sorting becomes fairly common. It seems that family 
resemblance categories occur only in knowledge rich domains 
(a description that would fit most natural categories). The 
authors consider the possibility that "the apparent use of 
family resemblance rules may be masking the use of a deeper 
principle that some core factor or cause is present which 
probabilistically leads to surface structure (family 
resemblance) features" (Medin et al., 1987, p. 273). It 
would follow that, contrary to a family resemblances model, 
if categories do have a core factor they would also have 
sharp boundaries. 
From a different theoretical background, Anderson's 
ACT, and ACT* (Anderson, 1976, 1983; Reder & Anderson, 
1980), provide further evidence for the need to take feature 
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interdependency into account. ACT is a general model of 
memory storage and retrieval for lexical items that uses a 
network architecture. Since it has been shown that priming 
effects are very rapidly evident after the onset of the 
prime and nearly at full strength, Anderson uses spreading 
activation as a retrieval mechanism that selects nodes that 
are going to be matched. Unlike other spreading activation 
models, RT is not a function of a spreading activation rate, 
but of the number of nodes that have to be matched. Since 
Smith, Adams, and Schorr (1978) found that more nodes did 
not mean greater RT when the facts represented in the nodes 
where highly integrated, Reder and Anderson (1980) included 
in ACT, nodes of integrated knowledge, that people could use 
to make consistency judgements when asked to retrieve a 
fact. 
It is reasonable to conclude that when people have 
access to knowledge that is highly integrated (i.e, 
connected by causal schemata or other types of relations)--
as it presumably is when faced with natural categories--
their mode of processing and representation varies, and 
inter-feature relations (theories) may come to play a 
central role in the decision process. 
Process Theories 
Process theories explore the possibility that some 
characteristics of category verification (especially numbers 
3 through 7 on pages 5-6) are more the product of a 
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cognitive mechanism or process, than of the structure of 
knowledge representation. Even for Spreading Activation--
which does make structural assumptions--it is safe to say 
that its distinctive quality is the postulated process: the 
rate in which activation spreads throughout a network. I 
will distinguish here between deterministic and 
probabilistic theories, the difference being that the latter 
type of models, with the intention of accounting for more 
aspects of the data (e.g., types of distributions, 
variances, etc.), incorporate some probabilistic mechanism 
such as random walk, specific probability distributions of 
representations, etc. 
Deterministic Process Theories 
Spreading Activation 
Several contemporary theories of memory propose that 
memory traces are organized in networks and that retrieval 
depends, at least in part, on an automatic, attention-free 
process, often characterized as spreading activation (e.g., 
Anderson, 1976, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Quillian, 
1968). Although specific details differ from theory to 
theory, four principles are common to most of these 
theories: (a) retrieving a memory amounts to activating the 
relevant trace in the memory representation; (b) activation 
of a memory trace spreads to all traces to which it is 
connected; (c) the amount of activation arriving at a memory 
trace is inversely related to its distance from a source of 
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activation; and (d) the time required to retrieve a memory 
trace is inversely related to its activation level; that is, 
more active traces are retrieved faster than less active 
traces. 
These principles lead to several predictions about 
performance in memory retrieval tasks, such as lexical 
(e.g., word vs. nonword) decisions. For example, to the 
extent that (a) lexical decisions involve memory retrieval 
and (b) associated concepts are closer in memory than 
unassociated concepts, then lexical decisions on a word 
(e.g., chair) should be faster, on the average, when those 
decisions are preceded, or primed, by decisions on 
associated words (e.g., table) than when those decisions are 
primed by decisions on unassociated words (e.g., shoe). 
In Quillian's initial formulation (Quillian, 1968) a 
concept can be represented as a node in a network, with 
properties of the concept represented as labeled relational 
links (e.g., superordinate links or is a) from the node to 
other concept nodes. These links are pointers, and usually 
go in both directions between the concepts. Links can have 
different criterialities, which are numbers (not a 
probability) indicating how essential each link is to the 
meaning of the concept. The criteriality may differ going 
in one direction or the other. In Quillian's theory one 
could reach any node of the semantic network starting from 
any of the other nodes, that is the full meaning of any 
concept is the whole network as entered from the concept 
node, allowing in this way for multiple meanings that are 
constructed depending on the context. 
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In a category verification task, the search in memory 
between concepts involves tracing out in parallel along the 
links from the nodes specified by the input, and then from 
those nodes that have been reached to the ones that they 
have links with. This process leaves a trace or activation 
tag. In the process, when a tag from another starting point 
is encountered, an intersection between the nodes has been 
found. By following the tags back to both starting nodes, 
the path can be reconstructed and evaluated. Priming 
involves the same tracing process, since any active node 
will spread activation to connected nodes to some 
unspecified depth, providing a context mechanism because 
related terms are likely to receive activation whereas 
unrelated terms are not. 
Formulations began by assuming the simplest possible 
structure, as can be seen in Collins and Quillian (1969) 
where superordinate features were represented only in the 
superordinate node and not in every node of the category 
(e.g., has feathers was directly connected to bird but not 
to all specific birds, such as robin or sparrow). This 
variant is, then, one where categories are represented in an 
economical nested and hierarchical fashion. Consistent with 
their model, Collins and Quillian found that it took longer 
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to respond to a feature question than to a category question 
since, for example, robin is directly connected to bird, but 
indirectly connected to has feathers through bird, thus 
taking more time for activation to spread from one point to 
the other. 
With the proper assumptions, the theory is capable of 
explaining all of the phenomena that have been described 
related to categorization tasks, by a process of spreading 
activation in a network of interconnected nodes. This is 
what Collins and Loftus have done (Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Loftus, 1975). Collins and Loftus (1975) added some 
assumptions that enabled them to explain several facts that 
challenged early versions of Spreading Activation theory. 
Some of their assumptions were: 
1. Activation spreads out along the paths of the 
network on a decreasing gradient; thus the activation 
becomes more attenuated over distance. 
2. The more properties two concepts have in common, 
the more links are between the nodes and the more closely 
related are the concepts. 
3. The total activation is a limited quantity, so that 
high activation of a node will make other nodes temporarily 
less available for processing. 
This allowed the theory to explain some facts exposed 
by Rosh (1975a) that seemed to go counter its predictions. 
For example, priming less typical members actually 
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lengthened their RTs on category verification. The 
explanation calls for an interplay of the three assumptions, 
and states that if a word (e.g., jump rope) can be 
categorized in several categories (e.g., toy and exercise), 
priming of that word with a less related concept such as 
sport will add very little activation to jump rope, but it 
will probably activate good examples of sports and, by 
Assumption 3, actually decrease the accessibility of J..1!!!l£ 
rope. 
The reason for Assumption 1 was that it had not been 
possible to prove that priming had an effect if done with 
anything less than highly related terms (e.g., apple to 
red). In other words there was no mediated priming effect 
(e.g., lion to stripes, through big-cats and tiger), where 
the original formulation imposed no limit on the depth of 
the spread of activation, thus predicting a mediated priming 
effect. 
However, McNamara and Altarriba (1988) show that under 
some conditions, even 3 step mediated priming occurs, 
arguing that the effect will appear only under some 
conditions. These conditions are: (a) content of the list 
used as target words, specifically if the list did not 
contain directly related words, the mediated priming effect 
materialized; (b) retrieval strategy, specifically if 
relatedness checking was eliminated as a strategy, the 
effect was again observed. McNamara and Altarriba conclude 
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that spreading activation is the only theory that can 
account for these results, and that mediated priming had not 
been observed before because of people's post-retrieval 
strategies. However, this result can be also interpreted as 
casting doubt on the whole issue of automaticity of lexical 
decisions, and placing emphasis on the subject's active 
construction of a strategy to solve the task at hand, which 
would involve strategies to select which features are 
relevant for that particular lexical decision, taking into 
account not only strictly meaning relations but also task 
demands. 
Before continuing with other process theories, consider 
a methodological problem that is general to all lexical 
decision models, but that can be best illustrated with 
spreading activation theory. The spreading activation 
approach has been criticized on the basis of being post-hoc, 
since additional assumptions seem to always make it possible 
to save the model under contradictory evidence (Loftus, 
1975; Rosch, 1975b). The fact is that the same critiques 
have been made of other theories, such as Ratcliff's 
Compound Cue theory (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1988), and can be made to almost any (if not all) theories 
in the field. The post-hoc development of theories is not 
by and in itself a problem; it is hard to imagine developing 
a theory without starting from some known facts that one 
thinks can be explained in some new way. The problem may 
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arise only when the theory is sustained on the same facts 
that allowed it to develop. But even somebody that is very 
confident of the results of theoretic enterprises in 
psychology cannot but ask if this state of affairs does not 
render theories unfalsifiable. 
The state of theorization can be best understood by 
Anderson's following statement: "If ACT makes a prediction 
that proves wrong, the exact version of ACT will have to be 
abandoned but I am obviously going to propose a slight 
variant of the theory with slightly changed assumptions that 
is compatible with those data" (Anderson, 1976, p. 532). On 
this matter, and acknowledging that it would be desirable 
from a logical point of view, there is no way to have (at 
least at the present state) a formalized and purely 
deductive theory of lexical decision processes. As such, 
ad-hoc theorizing is not only unavoidable but necessary, and 
it should not be considered a weakness unless one is willing 
to apply the critique to the whole field. 
Feature Comparison 
Feature comparison theories are an alternative to 
spreading activation, both being, in a general sense, 
mappable into one another. 
Compound cue theory. The compound cue model (Ratcliff 
& McKoon, 1988) is designed to account for phenomena 
(specially priming) usually attributed to the action of a 
spreading activation process. 
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The model assumes that on a category verification task 
where the target word has been primed (e.g., apple primed 
with sweet), target and prime are combined at retrieval into 
a compound cue that is used to access memory. "The 
familiarity of this compound [F(Ll)] is the sum over all 
images in memory of the [association] strength of the prime 
to an image multiplied by the strength of the target to that 
same image multiplied by the strength of the context to that 
same image" (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988, p. 388). If the 
representations of the target and the prime are associated 
in memory, the match is greater than if they are not 
associated, facilitating the response to the target. 
F (Ll) = ,;-, ( S S Wp S (1-Wp)) L- ck ik jk 
k 
( 2) 
i = prime 
i = target word 
k = all images in memory 
Wp = prime coefficient (0 :S Wp :S 1) 
£ = context cue 
In the above formula, the effect of context (Sek) can 
be considered a constant different from zero for all trials 
in the same task. In this case, 
F (Ll) = E ( s. Wp s. (1-Wp)) 1k Jk • ( 3) 
k 
The prime is given less weight in the calculation 
because the response is made to the target, not to the 
prime, but the pattern of results would remain the same if 
Wp and (1-Wp) were omitted. In this case, 
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( 4) 
With this simplified formula the example in Table 1 can 
be followed. Let us assume that 2 is the prime, and that 3 
and 5 are target words. Here, F(2,3) is greater than F(2,5) 
because 2 and 3 are strongly associated (S23 = 1.0) while 2 
and 5 are only weakly associated (S25 = 0.2). It should be 
clear that if 2 and 5 were both strongly associated to a 
third item in memory (e.g., S35 = 1.0 instead of 0.2) the 
familiarity value of 3 and 5 would increase. 
An important empirical support for the compound cue 
theory was that, as the theory predicts, Ratcliff and others 
found that priming occurred only when prime and target were 
directly related or both were highly connected to a third 
item in memory, with 2 step priming effects much weaker than 
direct priming. As has been already noted, McNamara and 
Altarriba (1988) reported 3 step mediated priming effects 
which would support a spreading activation mechanism that 
retrieves all--however indirectly--associated items (as in 
ACT), with a more precise selection occurring through 
Table 1 















= 1. 20 
Images in memory (k) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 
0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 
0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
* 0.2) + (1.0 * 1.0) + (1. 0 
* 1.0) + (0.2 * 0. 2) + (0.2 
* 0.2) + (1.0 * 0.2) + (1. 0 
* 1.0) + (0.2 * 1.0) + (0.2 






post-retrieval strategies. McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) argue 
that a Compound Cue theory could account for mediated 
priming if mediated primes and targets were directly 
(although weakly) related. 
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Two stage model. As another alternative to spreading 
activation, Smith et al. (1974) propose a two stage model of 
feature comparison. One of the advantages of the model is 
that it deals with problems such as similarity judgement 
asymmetries by characteristics of the process, and not so 
much by structural aspects (Shoben, 1976). 
This model assumes that the meaning of words can be 
represented in memory by a list of features and that 
classifications are made by comparing features rather than 
by examining links in a network. The features can be used to 
define categories, but they vary in the extent to which they 
are associated with a category. The most essential features 
are called defining features, which are features that an 
entity must have in order to be a member of the category, 
and the remainder are called characteristic features, which 
are usually possessed but not necessary characteristics. 
The model has two stages. The first one is a general 
or holistic comparison, in which all features are compared. 
If the comparison reveals that our concepts are very similar 
or very dissimilar in the first stage, we can respond true 
or false immediately. The second stage considers only 
defining features, and is only necessary when the results of 
the first stage fall between two extreme values of overall 
similarity. 
The model incorporates a probabilistic component by 
assuming normal distribution of a target word's overall 
36 
similarity (considering both characteristic and defining 
features) to a category. Furthermore, typicality is defined 
as overall similarity. For a category member, as typicality 
decreases both the probability of needing the second 
processing stage (which means longer RT), and of erroneously 
rejecting it as false increase. In the case of non-members, 
similarity is called relatedness. For them, if relatedness 
increases both the probability of needing a second stage, 
and of erroneously accepting it as true increase. 
The theory is able to account for the same data as 
spreading activation, but according to Collins and Loftus 
(1975), this is because it is not really a different theory: 
"Any process that can be represented in a feature model is 
representable in a network model; in particular, the Smith 
et al. model itself could be implemented in a semantic 
network . . [in] Quillian's theory . . the parallel 
search would inevitably lead to . . a feature comparison 
process" (Collins & Loftus, 1975, p. 410). One is 
confronted here with a situation in which it is practically 
impossible to find a way to decide which theory is better, 
leaving the clear sensation that they are (for almost all 
purposes) interchangeable. 
There is one aspect, however, that seems to be 
different. The two stage model clearly predicts a 
correlation between typicality, true RT, and error rate. 
More specifically, for each category error rate and RT will 
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consistently decrease as typicality increases (Smith et al., 
1974). This prediction cannot be derived from spreading 
activation theories unless they are coupled with other 
assumptions. This relationship will be very important to us 
later on, since the rest of the models I will review from 
this point on have it built in as an aspect of the cognitive 
process involved in lexical decision tasks, and as such is a 
necessary and very clear prediction. 
As compared to others that have been reviewed, the two 
stage model assumes that there is a core to a category (the 
defining features), and that the error-RT correlation is not 
the result of categories with fuzzy limits (such as in 
family resemblances or in dimensional models) but a result 
characteristic of the decision process involved. The same 
should be said about spreading activation. 
Probabilistic Process Theories 
The theories that will be examined here are not meant 
to deal specifically with the categorization process. They 
are general memory models that have been developed to deal 
primarily with Sternberg type tasks (the Sternberg task 
[1966] is one where a subject has to decide if a given 
stimulus belongs or not to a previously memorized list, 
which is usually called search set). These models are 
related to developments within the signal detection 
paradigm, hence they treat similarity as a signal that can 
vary in intensity. In fact, if these models are applied to 
category verification, typicality corresponds to the 
intensity of the signal. For example, deciding if a robin 
is a bird is analogous to evaluating the presence of a 
signal of class membership. The more typical the member, 
the stronger the signal. 
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These models are relevant to the category verification 
process because they can deal with RT findings (mainly 
numbers 4-6 of our list on pages 5 and 6) without tying them 
to structural assumptions about sharpness or fuzziness of 
category boundaries. Their most general assumption is that 
RTs in category verifications can be decomposed into the 
time involved in the decision process itself, and a residual 
time that involves all other processes such as motor 
response (Luce, 1986). The models that will be reviewed in 
this section are all interested in the decision process 
only. 
Research in this area is not limited to model 
development, but (similarly to Rosch's methodological 
approach) some research is directed to determine 
characteristics of the models that are permissible, e.g. if 
the process is continuous vs. discrete, and serial vs. 
parallel (Meyer et al., 1988). 
Diffusion Theory 
According to the Diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978, 1980; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988), in a Sternberg type task 
(Sternberg, 1966) the target item is encoded and then 
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compared with each item in the search set simultaneously. 
Each individual comparison is assumed to be accomplished by 
a random walk process (actually, the diffusion process would 
be the continuous equivalent to a discrete random walk) A 
positive decision is made when any of the parallel 
comparisons terminates with a match, or when all the 
comparisons terminate with a nonmatch. All information is 
mapped onto relatedness, which is an unidimensional 
variable. 
The critical assumption is that the drift rate in the 
diffusion process is equal to the relatedness value (see 
Figure 2), so that the greater the target to memory-set 
relatedness, the faster the match boundary is reached. 
When applied to a category verification task, the 
theory works in the following manner: a single comparison is 
made, where the target word is compared to the category 
representation (whatever that is), and the similarity value 
(or typicality) that results specifies the drift rate of a 
single continuous random walk process. 
The model elegantly explains the simultaneous increase 
in skewness (and also RT variance) as mean RT increases, as 
a result of the decrease in the parameter u (drift rate). 
It is also clear that since it is a stochastic process, the 
probability of an error increases as relatedness decreases. 
Since the boundaries (~, and Q) are variable criteria, 
speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) can be explained as an 
Figure 2. A model of a diffusion process leading to a 
positive match response 
a match 
2 
s ' variance 




Note. Adapted from "A theory of memory retrieval" by R. 
Ratcliff, 1978, Psychological Review, 85(2), p. 64. 
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adjustment of those boundaries. By moving them closer to~, 
subjects may decrease their RTs at the expense of increasing 
the error rate (Meyer et al., 1988). 
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Decision Theory 
According to this model proposed by Hockley and Murdock 
(1987), the memory comparison process on a category 
verification task yields a ygg and a no distribution, to 
which noise is added before the actual decision process (see 
Figure 3). If the signal plus noise is above an upper 
criterion or below a lower criterion a ygg or no decision 
can be made. However if the distance between the two 
variable criteria (a and b) was too large in relation to the 
variance of the noise, the system could end up in a 
situation of not being able to produce a decision. To 
prevent such a situation, it is assumed that the distance 
between the two criteria is reduced by a constant fraction 
over time. This fraction is called Criteria Convergence 
Rate (CCR). If the signal plus noise falls in the wait zone 
(between the criteria), noise is added again and a new 
decision is attempted. Each time the decision process has 
to be repeated, the duration of the decision cycle becomes 
increasingly longer in relation to the Base Cycle Time 
(BCT) . 
Based on the idea that the CNS is a noisy system, the 
model is constructed so that decision accuracy is reduced by 
system noise. Going back again to points 4 through 6 on 
pages 5 and 6, errors are attributed, at least in part, to 
this noise and not to the knowledge structure. The model 
will yield the typical skewed RT distributions, basically 
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Figure 3. A model of the decision process 
NOi SE 
PROBE MEMORY 
COM PAR I SON 
DECISION 
NO WA.IT YES 
a b 
Note. Adapted from "A decision model for accuracy and 
response latency in recognition memory" by W. E. Hockley, & 
B. B. Murdock, 1987, Psychological Review, 94, p. 342. 
due to the change in the cycle time of the decision process 
(each cycle becomes longer). It can also explain SAT as a 
change in the initial locations of the criteria (a and b), 
and of the CCR. The greater the initial distance between a 
and b, and the slower the CCR the more accurate but the 
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slower the response will be. Conversely, if accuracy will 
be traded off for speed, the initial separation between a 
and b has to be smaller (reducing the need of repeating the 
decision cycle) or the CCR has to be faster. 
One specific characteristic of this model that 
differentiates it from the diffusion model is that in the 
decision model evidence does not accumulate over time 
(Hockley & Murdock, 1987, 1992). This very important 
difference between models that assume a discrete or a 
continuous transmission of information has been thought as 
one that could be used to derive empirically testable 
predictions that would provide evidence for one of the 
assumptions, and thereby implicate a certain class of models 
(i.e., continuous or discrete informational flow). 
Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off Studies 
As we have seen, Ratcliff's model is representative of 
models that assume a continuous information accumulation, 
whereas Hockley and Murdock's model is representative of 
models that assume that information does not accumulate over 
time. Since both types of models can account for SAT 
findings (mainly by assuming that subjects have control over 
some variable criteria), Meyer et al. (1988) developed a 
speed-accuracy decomposition technique that was expected 
to help solve the question of whether there was a continuous 
information accumulation. 
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Interpretation of the technique's results requires the 
assumption that there are two processes that are racing to 
produce an answer: the normal decision process, and a 
guessing process. This metamodel relies on several 
assumptions, but basically it is assumed that the guessing 
process starts when a response signal is present, produces a 
response based on any partial information it has available 
from the normal process, and that both processes are 
temporally independent, which means that initiation or 
termination of the guessing process will not interfere with 
the normal process, nor the normal process will interfere 
with the guessing process. 
The procedure itself consists of having a mixture of 
normal and signal trials. On normal trials the subjects 
produce a response once they have reached a decision, 
whereas on signal trials subjects have to produce a response 
immediately after a response signal has appeared. On signal 
trials, response signals are placed below the threshold for 
accurate responses. Once responses are obtained, guessing 
accuracy can be estimated by statistically removing the 
contribution of the completed normal process fast responses, 
to the observed accuracy of responses on signal trials and 
then examining the residual that remains. This residual 
would be the accuracy of the guessing process. 
For the task Meyer et al. (1988) call single-string 
lexical decision task (deciding if a single string was a 
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word or a non-word), it was found that when mean guessing 
accuracy was plotted against mean guessing completion time, 
a continuous increase in accuracy was obtained, which they 
interpreted as evidence of a continuous accumulation of 
partial information. 
Based on this result, Gronlund and Ratcliff (1991) 
concluded that Hockley and Murdock's Decision Model could 
not account for SAT because in their model there is no 
accumulation of information during the decision process. In 
their reply, Hockley and Murdock (1992) contend that their 
model can account for speed-accuracy decomposition results 
if it was assumed that "subjects do not encode the test 
probe in the same way when speed is emphasized as when 
accuracy is emphasized" (Hockley & Murdock, 1992, p. 463) 
More specifically, when speed is emphasized, subjects may 
not fully encode the probe, resulting in a decrease in 
accuracy. 
A stronger critique of the interpretation of 
speed-accuracy decomposition results as evidence of a 
continuous accumulation of information, comes from Ritske de 
Jong (1991). The critique centers around the Temporal 
Independence assumption. Based on evidence from 
intersensory facilitation studies, de Jong conjectures that 
the response signal can have a dual role, by not only 
initiating the guessing process, but also speeding the 
normal process, and thus violating the Temporal Independence 
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assumption. This violation would cause the speed-accuracy 
decomposition technique to under or overestimate the 
guessing process parameters. Specifically, it may happen 
that the technique overestimates the guessing accuracy by 
incorporating into that distribution results due to the 
speeded normal process. De Jong presents a pure guessing 
model in which an independent and parallel guessing process 
does not have access to the normal process, being only at 
chance level, and where the increase in accuracy can be 
completely explained by the facilitation effects of the 
response signal on the normal process. De Jong uses his 
model to fit decomposition data, and concludes that discrete 
models where information does not accumulate over time can 
account for the data. 
Error-Reaction Time Correlation 
The mechanisms that produce Error-RT correlations in 
most models are highly related to those involved in SAT, and 
the fact that there is a direct relation between RT and 
categorization errors has been incorporated in almost all 
models (structure or process oriented). In dimensional 
models for example, in an absolute judgement task if two 
stimuli are highly similar, they are frequently confused 
(errors), and the latency to identify the particular form 
presented is relatively long (Hutchinson & Lockhead, 1977). 
This is consistent with the idea of categories having fuzzy 
boundaries. In the process models of lexical decisions the 
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error-RT correlation has been a built-in property, and as 
such is a prediction of the models. Ratcliff's model states 
this relation explicitly, and the same happens in Hockley's 
model. 
Since according to King and Anderson (1976) virtually 
all the experimental effects obtained in the data, either on 
RT or errors, were qualitatively the same under accuracy 
emphasis and speed emphasis, I will put together 
explanations of errors and SAT in three groups: 
1. The decision process is a continuous accumulation 
of information, and errors are produced by a decrease in the 
amount of information that is required in order to make the 
decision. If subjects are willing to make decisions with 
less information (that is to trade-off accuracy for speed), 
such information will be incomplete and errors attributable 
to the process should occur. In the diffusion model this 
would be a change in the criteria (the limits of the random 
walk process). Also any category verification decision with 
a low relatedness value (low drift rate) will have (even if 
speed is not emphasized) a higher probability of yielding an 
error. 
2. De Jong's (1991) pure guessing model can be 
extended to account not only for SAT, but also for errors in 
any lexical decision task. In fact, King and Anderson 
(1976) postulate two independent processes: spreading 
activation process, and pure guessing process. The latter 
assumes that subjects have a certain tendency to make 
guesses which are just at chance level. It is possible to 
assign to those guesses a probability distribution as a 
function of time. An error will occur when an incorrect 
guess is made before the stimulus controlled process has 
generated a correct response. In effect, there is a race 
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between both processes to determine the response. Subjects 
would normally produce errors for slow decision processes 
because the guess process would have a greater chance of 
finishing first. Subjects would.trade accuracy for speed by 
speeding up their distributions of guessing times, thereby 
producing more errors, but also decreasing their average 
correct RT. If we add de Jong's hypothesis about the 
facilitating function of a response signal, we have a 
complete theory that can explain speed-accuracy 
decomposition results, and error distributions in lexical 
decision tasks. 
3. Hockley and Murdock (1992) hypothesize that SAT 
develops because subjects do not encode the test probe in 
the same way when speed is emphasized as when accuracy is 
emphasized. More specifically, when speed is emphasized, 
subjects may not fully encode the probe, resulting in a 
decrease in accuracy. Errors are then the product of 
changes in codification under speed conditions. 
In the specific case of category verifications, there 
are at least two other explanations for the error-RT 
correlation. They deal with the problem of how an error 
should be operationally defined: 
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1. There are two ways to understand the idea of fuzzy 
boundaries. One is within subjects: that people's cognitive 
representation of categories is fuzzy. The other is between 
subjects: that even if agreeing on clear or central cases, 
people have zones of disagreement between them about which 
cases belong or not to a certain category. The first 
interpretation would yield the error-RT correlation because 
decisions for unclear cases would be difficulti and hence 
would take longer and be error prone. The second 
interpretation suggests that some errors would be due to 
differences in the mental lexicon, not due to the process. 
I will call these normative errors because they are errors 
only in reference to some authority, not psychological 
errors. These normative errors cannot be considered errors, 
because it is clear that when theories refer to errors they 
are talking about errors that if allowed to, the subject can 
correct, just as in signal detection studies, if allowed 
sufficient time the subject can correctly identify the 
signal. Normative errors, just as true process errors, will 
occur not in the central cases of the category (for which 
most people would agree), but in boundary ones, reflecting 
disagreement between subjects, hence incorrectly adding to 
the error-RT correlation. 
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2. It may be that somebody really does not know if 
some features apply to a target word, in which case he or 
she would be forced to guess. For example, some people may 
have trouble deciding if a porcupine is a marsupial, if not 
for the secondary fact that porcupines are not typical of 
Australia. This type of error is due to lack of the proper 
knowledge and the use of correlated facts as a decision 
heuristic. Again, in this case errors are more prone to 
occur in the limiting cases than in the central ones, for 
which subjects are bound to have more of the relevant 
knowledge to aid in the decision process. 
The procedure I have devised to bypass these last two 
problems in the operational definition of an error is to 
count as an error only those responses the subject considers 
an error. Even further, I have made the hypothesis that if 
we use this last operational definition of an error, we will 
get a substantial reduction in the error-RT correlation, as 
compared to the results when a normative definition is used. 
A Model of Structure and Process 
This review of the literature suggests an adequate 
theory of concepts might have the following characteristics. 
From a structure point of view, there is some agreement 
that in order to account for similarity in the conceptual 
domain, interrelations between features have to be included, 
whether in the form of relational features (Gati & Tversky, 
1984; Goldstone et al., 1991), or in the form of subjective 
theories that people have about a given domain (Medin et 
al., 1987). 
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Elaborating on these ideas, if we assume a knowledge 
structure is made up of theories about things that can be 
done in the real world (so most features would be 
functional), then features would have a cohesive structure 
of their own, given by causal, structure-function, and other 
types of relations (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Such a structure 
would have some advantages: if asked to check if a given 
animal can fly, knowledge that it has feathers can help you 
answer with a certain degree of confidence; if asked if a 
given animal is a marsupial, a fairly good decision can be 
made based solely on the knowledge that it is or is not 
found in Australia. 
Furthermore, I assume that related features can aid or 
impair the process, even if you do know the relevant 
information necessary to provide a correct answer. If 
someone is verifying several interrelated features, when it 
is known that the first feature is either positive or 
negative for the target word, the second one can be expected 
to be the same; when one's expectations are met processing 
of the second feature is faster, but when they are not met, 
processing of the second feature is actually slowed down. 
In other words, consistency will speed up the process, and 
inconsistency will slow it down. I will refer to this as a 
synergy effect (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. This model assumes a strategic coding process 













This approach implies that in knowledge-rich domains 
concepts do have cores (even though they may be complex), 
and therefore also sharp boundaries. A core would be formed 
in most cases by several theories. For example in the bird 
category, people could have theories about flying, about 
specific birds, about nesting, etc. It follows that 
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category verification errors, and the error-RT correlation 
are not the result of fuzzy boundaries and should instead be 
accounted for by process characteristics. 
From a process point of view, some authors favor the 
hypothesis that for several cognitive processes data are 
consistent with a continuous information accrual with 
variable criteria (Luce, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978, 1980; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988), where people would be able to 
control variable criteria in order to trade speed for 
accuracy or vice versa, depending on the pay-off matrix 
specified by feedback or instructions (Hockley & Murdock, 
1987; Ratcliff, 1978, 1980; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988); but as 
we have seen, the same data can support other types of 
models, such as those where information does not 
continuously accumulate over time (Hockley & Murdock, 1987), 
or where SAT and errors are due to some type of guessing 
process (de Jong, 1991; King & Anderson, 1976). 
I am interested here in deepening the hypothesis that, 
in category verification at least, SAT and error-RT 
correlation under speed conditions can be interpreted--
following Hockley and Murdock (1987)--as the result of 
coding changes on a discrete stages model. Other problems, 
such as intersubject disagreement or lack of the proper 
knowledge, can account for part of the correlation, which 
means that operationally errors should be defined as those 
the subject considers so. 
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Coding changes would produce the error-RT correlation 
in the following manner. I assume, just as in ACT, that all 
related nodes are retrieved from memory (Anderson, 1976, 
1983; Reder & Anderson, 1980), but when in knowledge rich 
domains, complete theories instead of single features are 
retrieved, which will produce synergy in the decision 
process. After retrieval, post-retrieval strategies 
(McNamara & Altarriba, 1988) are used to select which 
features are relevant to the task at hand, and to construct 
a coded definition with those features. This coded 
definition is the one that is used in the category 
verification process. If certain conditions are met (i.e., 
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fufficient time is allowed) then the concept's full meaning 
can be coded and error-less category verifications can be 
made. On the other hand, post-retrieval strategies are 
sensitive to extra-semantic task demands such as speed 
emphasis. In this model, speed requirements are handled by 
resorting to a simpler abbreviated coded definition, which 
would provide an increase in consistency (and consequently 
an increase in speed) as compared to the consistency 
provided by the concept's full meaning. For example, a 
simpler definition for the bird category would be a theory 
about conditions that have to be met in order to be able to 
fly (e.g., having wings, having feathers, having hollow 
bones). Greater speed would be achieved at the expense of 
producing categorization errors on those specific cases that 
require the concept's full meaning in order to be properly 
categorized (e.g., birds that cannot fly, or bats). 
Predictions of the Model 
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The basic assumptions are that (a) concepts are formed 
by features (i.e. a language-like specification of 
conditions for category membership), and that (b) people 
should be able to use a feature based definition if provided 
with one. In the particular case of this model, if the 
coding process is a well defined stage of the category 
verification process, then there is no reason why people 
should not be able to perform category verification 
eliminating the retrieval stage if they are provided with an 
already coded concept, although at the present state I have 
no way of directly testing this assumption. 
Within these general assumptions, the specific 
hypothesis I plan to test is that many apparent errors in 
categorization tasks result from time pressure and 
consequent incomplete retrieval and/or encoding of the 
relevant concept. That is, the full concept, with its 
attendant theories, features, or properties is not brought 
to mind. Only an abbreviated version is available. The 
abbreviated version is incomplete and perhaps in some cases 
contradictory when compared to the complete version, and 
this leads to apparent fuzzy boundaries in categorization. 
That is, a member will be classified sometimes as in, 
sometimes as out of the category, depending on the exact 
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nature of the abbreviated version. However if one is given 
time to retrieve and encode a full category definition 
before the categorization task begins, this potential source 
of fuzziness will be eliminated, with the consequent 
reduction of the error-RT correlation. 
Probabilistic process theories make a different 
prediction if subjects are provided with a definition. 
Since only the speed requirement is the crucial variable to 
produce a speed accuracy trade-off, providing subjects under 
speed emphasis with an already coded definition should 
continue to produce an error-RT correlation. Even if a 
spreading activation model is equipped with a pure guessing 
model (King & Anderson, 1976), the error distribution should 
keep the same pattern. 
If it is shown that the error-RT correlation can be 
reduced, it can still be argued that it is because the very 
nature of the category verification task has been altered. 
The hypothesis here is that the task is the same under both 
conditions. If the RT distribution (mean, variance, but 
most important relative word RT ordering) remains unchanged, 
whether with or without definitions, then it can be argued 
that the task has remained the same. 
It is not clear what specific structural theories 
predict regarding the RT distribution when subjects are 
provided with a definition. If these theories assume that 
concepts have fuzzy boundaries (as Family Resemblance, and 
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Dimensional theories do) then the task has to be radically 
different when provided with a sharp-boundaries definition. 
This should be reflected in different RT distributions for 
the two tasks. 
Collins and Quillian (1969) would predict that 
providing a feature based definition of a category should 
increase mean RT, since in their model category features are 
represented only at the category node, thus increasing the 
distance that activation has to spread as compared to 
instance-category verification, where activation has to 
spread only from the category node to the target. In fact 
an increase in mean RT is what Collins and Quillian predict 
for situations where people are asked to verify if a given 
object has a feature that belongs to a whole category (see 
p. 24 of this thesis). Anderson's ACT (Anderson, 1983; 
Reder & Anderson, 1980) should predict a slight decrease of 
mean RT because feature retrieval (which in ACT would take 
around 150 milliseconds) would be eliminated as part of the 
process. 
To provide subjects with an already coded definition, 
the original idea was to devise a standard definition which 
all subjects would be asked to use. The problem with this 
approach is that people might show difficulties in using a 
standard definition because it is unclear, unfamiliar or 
unnatural to them, or because they simply lack practice with 
it. The solution chosen was to ask each individual to come 
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up with a definition for a given category. Because subjects 
can have difficulties in producing a definition which is not 
too inclusive or too partial, they must work through it with 
the experimenter until it is satisfactory. Subjects can 
then be asked to use that definition when going through the 
category verification task. The general aim is to get an 
agreed-upon definition that will capture not only the normal 
cases but also the atypical cases, including correlational, 
structure-function, and causal relations. 
If providing the subjects with a definition does not 
yield a significant decrease in the error-RT correlation, 
interpreting the results is more difficult. There are at 
least two alternative interpretations. It could be that 
people are able to use the agreed-upon definition, but they 
still produce the error-RT correlation, or that people are 
not able to use the agreed-upon definition, reverting to 
whatever they normally do, and hence make the same errors as 
control subjects. This last interpretation would indicate 
fuzziness as the deep source of errors. 
To be able to obtain an error-RT correlation it is 
necessary to produce speed emphasis conditions, which 
translates operationally in providing subjects with a 
reasonable speed criterion. To determine this criterion, a 
detailed review of reported RTs in several studies was done. 
For an instance-category verification task (similar to the 
one I will present subjects with) Collins and Quillian 
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(1969) report mean RTs in the range of 1000 to 1200 msec. 
It seems that these values are indicative of accuracy 
instructions. On the very simple task (decide if a single 
string was a word or a non-word) posed to subjects by Meyer 
et al.'s experiment 5 (1988), mean RT under speed emphasis 
conditions was in the 315-442 msec range. Also under speed 
emphasis, but on a more complex sentence verification task, 
King and Anderson (1976) reported mean RTs in the 850-1000 
msec range. Finally, Smith et al. (1974), on a category 
verification task similar to the one I will use, reported 
mean RTs in the 505-713 msec range (mean= 576.8 msec). 
These last values, and their high reported error% values 
(some around the 20% value), lead me to infer that they 
somehow produced a speed rather than an accuracy emphasis 
(even though this is not explicitly described in their 
paper), and those RT and error rate values will be taken 
initially as the speed emphasis parameters. Unfortunately 





The main hypothesis tested was that errors under speed 
emphasis were a result of variations of the coding process. 
If this was true, then providing subjects with an already 
coded definition would produce a change in the error 
distribution from when a coded definition was not provided. 
This change would show in several ways: 
1. When a definition was provided, a decrease in the 
average error per word would be observed. 
2. When a definition was provided, a decrease in the 
error-RT correlation would be observed. 
It was also necessary to show that the basic category 
verification task remained unchanged by the experimental 
requirements. If comparable RT distributions were found 
under both conditions (with and without a definition), then 
it could be argued that the basic process was not altered by 
the experimental manipulations. In this case, it was 
expected that: 
3. Target words would keep the same relative RT 
ordering under the definition condition as compared to the 
no-definition condition. 
As mentioned earlier, errors should be defined as those 
that the subject him or herself considered so. To this 
effect, subjects immediately informed orally any response 
they considered in error (concurrent report errors). As 
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another way of obtaining their error judgements, after the 
timed lexical decision task was finished, subjects were 
asked to review their responses and judge if each one of 
them was an error or not (retrospective report errors). 
These self reported errors were judged against two types of 
normative criteria: a lax normative criterion, based on 
category norms from Battig and Montague (Battig & Montague, 
1969), considering any word in Battig and Montague's lists 
as a category member (normative lax errors), and a 
restrictive normative definition that considered only some 
of the most typical cases as members, based on an ad-hoc 
definition (normative restrictive errors). 
Earlier in this thesis it has been argued that a 
portion of the error-RT correlation can be attributed to 
individual differences in category membership judgements. 
From this discussion on the nature of errors, the following 
hypothesis was produced: 
4. Using self-reported errors would result in a 
decrease of the error-RT correlation, as compared to when 
normative criteria was used to judge errors. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 80 students from introductory psychology 
courses; these were volunteers who were given course credit 
for their participation. 
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Stimuli 
Stimuli were generated from lists provided by Rosch 
(Rosch, 1975a). Two categories were used: furniture and 
vehicle. For each one, a list of 63 target words was 
generated by sampling Rosch's lists: 39 target words from 
each category list, trying to cover the whole range of 
goodness of examples, but over-representing the ones near 
the category border, so that subjects had a higher 
probability of producing high error rates; and 24 false 
target words from categories not being used (fruits, 
vegetables, carpenter's tools, weapons, birds, toys, and 
clothing) that were not in the furniture or vehicle 
categories. In the end, I had a list of 39 member and 24 
non-member target words for each category verification task. 
A fairly high proportion of non-member words was included in 
order to avoid introducing a response bias. All subjects 
had a short practice session before the actual category 
verification, in order to familiarize them with the task. 
The category used for practice trials was sports, and it 
consisted of 43 trials (28 category members and 15 non-
members). Actual stimuli can be found in Appendix A. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in two adjacent rooms. 
The apparatus were in a control room from where the 
experimenter saw the subject, recorded utterances, 
controlled stimuli presentation, and printed results. 
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Stimuli were computer generated and presented in 40 x 
25 text mode, in the center of the screen. A program 
written for the purpose in Microsoft QuickBASIC v. 4.5 was 
used (the complete program can be found in Appendix B). The 
program incorporated assembly language timing routines 
reported by Graves and Bradley (1987, 1988). The computer 
was an ITT XTRA/286 XL microcomputer (an IBM PC-AT clone) 
running at 8 Mhz. The system included a monochrome monitor, 
two CGA color monitors (the subject viewed a Tandy 
monochromatic color monitor, Model 28-3211, from a distance 
of 50 cm; stimuli were duplicated on a comparable monitor 
viewed by the experimenter), a Televideo 920C terminal (used 
to post information about the course of the session for the 
convenience of the experimenter), an Epson FX-80 printer (on 
which the results were printed), and a response device 
constructed locally. 
The response devise was a plexiglass box containing two 
microswitches depressed by two keys mounted at a 20 degree 
angle. The subject placed his or her forefingers on the two 
respective keys, so that a slight pressure triggered the 
microswitches. The righthand switch was the positive 
response, and the lefthand switch the negative response. 
The device was connected to the joystick (game) port on the 
computer, an approach which (in conjunction with the timing 
routines noted above) ensured accuracy in recording 
keypresses to the nearest 1 ms (Segalowitz & Graves, 1991). 
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The experimenter had duplicate response keys but these were 
not used during the experiment. 
Verbal error reports were recorded on a tape-recorder 
in the control room, through an intercom placed on the wall 
at 90 cm from the subject. 
Procedure 
Subjects went through a three-part session (complete 
instructions can be found in Appendix C): 
Definition Production 
Only subjects from the definition condition group went 
through this part of the procedure. Each subject was asked 
to produce a definition for the category being used. Once a 
first tentative definition had been produced, subjects were 
questioned about their definition. The test questions asked 
were: 
1. Can you think of objects that you would accept as 
inside the category, that according to your definition 
should be considered outside? 
2. Can you think of objects that you would consider to 
be outside the category, but that would be inside according 
to your definition? 
If a subject did not understand, questions were 
rephrased. If the subject found examples to any of these 
questions, then he or she was asked to refine his or her 
definition, until a satisfactory definition was obtained. 
If the subject could not think of a word, the experimenter 
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provided a test word that he deemed unclear, from a 
pre-determined word list that did not appear in the category 
verification task. Once subjects had a definition, they 
were provided with paper and pencil and were required to 
write it down. They were instructed to use it when doing 
category verification. 
Category Verification 
All subjects went through the category verification 
task. To ensure speed emphasis on the task, subjects were 
instructed to respond as fast as possible. Also, RT 
feedback was provided on the video screen after each 
decision was made. Each time a RT was equal or greater than 
600 milliseconds (this value is an approximation to Smith et 
al.'s [1974] mean RT), a too slow message appeared on 
screen, and each time it fell below that limit, a your speed 
was O.K. message was displayed. At the start of each trial, 
a warning signal formed by a horizontal line of seven dashes 
appeared in the middle of the screen, where the target word 
would later appear. The warning signal was available for 
1.0 s, and 0.5 s after it had been removed the target word 
appeared. RT feedback was available for 3 s, and 1 s after 
it was removed a new warning signal appeared. Subjects were 
instructed to inform out loud and immediately after 
responding if any particular response was considered by them 
to be an error. These utterances were tape recorded and 
later coded as concurrent reports. Then came the practice 
session to familiarize subjects with the task. 
Both practice and actual trials had the same format. 
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If during practice trials a subject produced a mean RT below 
600 milliseconds, his or her mean RT was used instead of 
600 milliseconds as speed criterion in the experimental 
trials. This was to control for individual differences in 
speed. 
Retrospective Report 
After finishing the category verification task, 
subjects were asked to repeat it without time pressure. 
Definition condition subjects were asked to go through a 
printed version of the complete list of words, in the same 
order that it was presented to them, and asked to categorize 
each one as member or non-member according to the definition 
they agreed upon. Any response in the initial timed 
categorization task that did not agree with this last 
categorization was considered a retrospective report error. 
The procedure was more direct for no-definition condition 
subjects. They were handed a printed list of the 63 words 
and their responses and instructed to put a checkmark by any 
response that they believed to be an error. These were 




Two parallel experiments were conducted, each one with 
a different category (furniture, and vehicle), and each one 
with an N = 40. The 40 subjects in each category were 
randomly assigned either to the definition or to the no-
definition conditions. This last group was the control 
group. Order of presentation was controlled through 
complete randomization of word order. 
Data Analyses 
From each subject, six measures were obtained for each 
word: response (yes or no), reaction time, concurrent report 
of errors (from recorded utterances), retrospective report 
of errors (from their judgement after the timed task was 
finished), normative lax errors (the result of using 
category norms as criteria to judge errors), and normative 
restrictive errors (the result of using an ad-hoc definition 
to judge errors). These variables (except for response) 
were accumulated across subjects, to obtain 5 variables for 
each one of the 63 words: mean RT, and total number of 
errors according to each one of the 4 criteria used. 
Reversing the definition condition subject's responses 
according to their self-reported errors, allowed to obtain 
the subject's categorization for each word. In the case of 
the no-definition group, this variable was directly obtained 
from the third stage of the experimental session. This 
allowed me to obtain the number of subjects who agreed with 
the category norms for each one of the 63 words. This was 
the agreement variable, and it was used in the 
additional analyses. Four data analyses were performed. 
Hypothesis 1 
To test the hypothesis that when a definition is 
provided a decrease in errors should be observed, errors 
were averaged for the complete list of 63 words on both 
conditions, and a~ test for paired groups was performed. 
Hypothesis 2 
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To test the hypothesis that when a definition is 
provided a decrease in the error-RT correlation should be 
observed, two separate mean RTs and two separate error 
frequencies were obtained for each target word (one for the 
definition group, and one for the no-definition group). 
With both variables, a separate error-RT correlation 
coefficient was calculated for each group, and the 
hypothesis that there was a significant difference in 
correlations was tested. Considering that both correlations 
were not independent, I used a~ test for non-independent 
correlations devised by Williams and endorsed by Steiger 
(Steiger, 1980). 
Hypothesis 3 
The problem of testing the hypothesis that target words 
should keep roughly the same relative ordering in RTs under 
definition and no-definition conditions, was approached as a 
reliability problem. The 20 subjects from the no-definition 
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group were divided in two, producing two mean RTs for each 
one of the 63 words. These two variables were correlated, 
and that correlation corrected by the Spearman-Brown 
formula. This correlation was considered an estimate of the 
highest correlation between RTs that you could get if you 
were correlating two groups doing the same task (in fact 
this is a split-half reliability analysis considering 
subjects as items). Afterwards, two separate mean RTs were 
calculated for each target word (one from the definition 
group and one from the no-definition group), and the 
hypothesis that the correlation between both groups of RTs 
was as high as the one from the reliability analysis was 
tested by comparing 95% confidence intervals, and by testing 
that the correlation from the comparison between the two 
conditions could come from a population with a rho value 
equal to the results from the reliability analysis. 
Hypothesis 4 
To test the hypothesis that using self-reported errors 
will result in a decrease of the error-RT correlation, as 
compared to when normative criteria are used to judge 
errors, the difference between both correlations was tested 
using Williams' ~ test (Steiger, 1980). 
Additional Analyses 
1. Since it was observed that there was noticeable 
disagreement between subjects in their categorization 
judgements, the agreement variable was introduced, and 
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errors and RTs were correlated controlling the effect of 
agreement over errors. The procedure was to regress 
agreement over retrospective report errors, and to correlate 
the error residuals with RT. To clarify the effect of 
intersubject agreement on the error-RT correlation, 
retrospective report errors was decomposed into false 
positives, and false negatives. 
2. A characterization of the definitions given by 
subjects in the definition condition for each one of the 
categories was attempted, by classifying their definitions 
according to several criteria. 
Ten subjects from the definition condition in the 
furniture category were questioned about their conscious 




Symmetric RT distributions appeared normal upon visual 
inspection. All error measures were positively skewed, and 
agreement was negatively skewed, but considering that 
scattergrams showed linear relations between variables, and 
the absence of outliers, analyses were performed without 
transformations. 
In general, both conditions in both categories showed a 
significant correlation between reaction time and errors, as 
can be seen in Table 2. The consistent decrease in the 
observed correlation when concurrent report errors was used 
was due to subject's tendency to fail to mention some 
instances later considered errors (determined by comparing 
concurrent to retrospective reports). Consequently 
concurrent report errors was not used in subsequent 
analyses. 
Hypothesis 1 
It was hypothesized that the average number of errors 
per word would decrease from the no-definition to the 
definition condition. Contrary to what was expected, both 
categories showed an increase in mean retrospective report 
errors. To test the hypothesis, a paired groups two-tailed 
~ test was performed. In the case of the vehicle category 
the increase was significant, with ~(62) = -2.77, 2 < .05 
(mean error rate for the no-definition condition of 2.67, 
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SD of 2.22; mean error rate for the definition condition of 
3.43, SD of 2.54). In the case of the furniture category 
the increase was not significant, with ~(62) = -1.62, p < 
.11 (mean error rate for the no-definition condition of 
3.46, SD of 2.26; mean error rate for the definition 
condition of 4.03, SD of 2.68). 
Table 2 
Error-RT Correlations Calculated with Four Different 





























Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. CRE = Concurrent Report Errors; 
RRE = Retrospective Report Errors; NLE = Normative Lax 
Errors; NRE = Normative Restrictive Errors. 
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Hypothesis 2 
It was hypothesized that error-RT correlation would 
decrease when subjects used a definition, as compared to 
when they did not. Since word RTs under both conditions 
were themselves positively correlated, I used a~ test for 
non-independent correlations devised by Williams and 
endorsed by Steiger (1980). The results from both 
categories showed no significant difference in the error-RT 
correlation. For the vehicle category, Williams' test 
produced a value of ~(60) = -.9132, £ > .05. The value for 
the furniture category was ~(60) = -1.38, £ > .05. 
Hypothesis 3 
It was hypothesized that words would keep roughly the 
same relative RT ordering in definition and no-definition 
conditions. Testing this hypothesis was treated as a 
reliability question. A split-half approach was used. The 
20 subjects on the definition condition from both categories 
were divided into two subgroups. With each subgroup, a mean 
RT for each one of the 63 words was computed, and both sets 
of mean RTs were correlated. This correlation was corrected 
by the Spearman-Brown formula to obtain an estimate of the 
correlation that would result for the complete 20 subjects. 
This was considered to be an estimate of the maximum RT 
correlation between RT orderings that could be expected if 
two groups of 20 subjects were doing the same task. A 95% 
confidence interval was computed for the corrected 
correlation. 
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The RT variables from both the definition and the 
no-definition conditions were correlated, and Fisher's~ 
test was used to test the hypothesis that this value could 
be obtained from a population with a rho value equal to the 
correlation value of the reliability analysis performed 
earlier. Again, 95% confidence intervals were obtained. 
For both categories, correlations of RTs from both 
conditions were comparable to correlations from the 
reliability analyses. As can be seen in Table 3, for both 
categories there confidence intervals overlapped. 
Table 3 
Correlations Between Reaction Time Variables from Definition 
and No-Definition Conditions Compared to Maximum Expected 
Correlation 
Category corr. 95% CI 
Vehicle 
reliability .70 .54 s rsB s .87 -.71 60 >.05 
RT ordering .65 .47 s rho s .86 
Furniture 
reliability .74 .55 s rsB s .88 .93 60 >.05 
RT ordering .79 .62 s rho s .93 
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Hypothesis 4 
It was hypothesized that the magnitude of the error-RT 
correlation would be less when retrospective report errors 
were used instead of normative lax errors. This hypothesis 
was tested for the no-definition condition. Considering 
that both correlations are not independent (retrospective 
report errors and normative lax errors are themselves 
correlated), the~ test endorsed by Steiger (1980) was used. 
For the vehicle category, even though the correlation did 
decrease, the effect was not significant, with ~(60) = -.72, 
2 > .05. But for the furniture category, the difference was 
significant in the expected direction, with ~(60) = -2.22, 
2 < .05. 
Additional Analyses 
1. Since results from hypothesis 4 supported the idea 
that some of the error-RT correlation was due to 
disagreement with the error criterion, a more direct 
approach was taken by measuring agreement and statistically 
removing its effect over errors. On the no-definition 
condition, the agreement variable (the number of subjects 
for each word that during retrospective report agreed with 
the normative lax definition's categorization) was regressed 
over retrospective report errors. The new variable of 
retrospective report errors residuals was then correlated 
with RT. The hypothesis was tested that the correlation 
between retrospective report errors and RT had significantly 
decreased once the effect of disagreement over errors had 
been removed. Taking into account that errors and their 
residuals were also correlated, Williams' ~ test (Steiger, 
1980) was used. 
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Both categories showed a significant decrease in the 
error-RT correlation. For the vehicle category, ~(60) = 
-2.41, £ < .05. The new error-RT correlation once 
agreement was controlled was~= .2548 (significant at 
alpha= .05). For the furniture category, ~(60) = -2.31, 
£ < .05. The new error-RT correlation once agreement was 
controlled was~= .0457 (non significant). To show how 
agreement affects the error count, the total number of 
retrospective report errors for each word was decomposed 
into false negative and false positive errors, and put side 
by side with agreement values for visual inspection. Also, 
the probabilities of false positive and false negative 
errors were calculated. The results can be seen in Table 4 
and will be discussed in depth in the Discussion section. 
2. A characterization of the definitions given by 
subjects in the definition condition for each one of the 
categories was attempted by classifying their definitions 
according to several criteria. According to this analysis, 
a modal definition for furniture was: An item used to sit 
on, lay on, or hold things on. A modal definition for 
vehicle was: A means of transportation, a way of getting 
from one place to another (see Table 5). 
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Table 4 
Increase in False Positive Errors Probability for Words with 
Disagreement in the No-Definition Condition 
Category FP FN RRE Ag :g_(FP) :g_(FN) 
Furniture 
chair 0 1 1 20 
couch 0 1 1 20 
rocking chair 0 1 1 20 
coffee table 0 4 4 19 0 .21 
rocker 0 2 2 19 0 .11 
desk 1 1 2 19 * 1 .05 
bed 0 1 1 20 
chest 0 2 2 18 0 .11 
bookcase 0 2 2 20 
lounge 6 2 8 11 * .66 .18 
cabinet 1 0 1 17 * .33 0 
stool 0 1 1 17 0 .06 
piano 1 1 2 14 * .17 .07 
lamp 0 1 1 15 0 .07 
mirror 1 1 2 10 * .10 .10 
television 1 1 2 11 * .11 .09 
bar 1 2 3 9 * .09 .22 
(table continues) 
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Category FP FN RRE Ag :g_(FP) :g_(FN) 
shelf 1 1 2 18 * .50 .06 
bench 0 1 1 18 0 .06 
closet 10 0 10 4 * .63 0 
fan 5 0 5 6 * .36 0 
clock 4 0 4 10 * .40 0 
end table 0 4 4 20 
bean bag 0 5 5 13 0 .38 
rug 5 1 6 8 * .42 .13 
pillow 7 2 9 5 * .47 .40 
wastebasket 6 0 6 6 * .42 0 
sewing machine 4 0 4 6 * .29 0 
personal computer 4 0 4 2 * .22 0 
drapes 6 1 7 5 * .40 .20 
picture 3 0 3 5 * .20 0 
ashtray 7 0 7 2 * .39 0 
telephone 7 0 7 4 * .50 0 
refrigerator 5 0 5 7 * .38 0 
sink 5 0 5 7 * .38 0 
counter 3 3 6 14 * .50 .21 
stove 5 1 6 8 * .42 .13 
cushion 3 1 4 12 * .38 .08 
radio 2 0 2 3 * .12 0 
(table continues) 
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Category FP FN RRE Ag £ (FP) £ (FN) 
Vehicle 
station wagon 0 2 2 20 
truck 0 0 0 20 
car 0 2 2 20 
bus 0 1 1 20 
motorcycle 0 1 1 20 
streetcar 0 0 0 20 
cable car 0 1 1 20 
train 0 0 0 20 
rowboat 1 0 1 19 * 1.0 0 
airplane 0 0 0 20 
ship 0 2 2 20 
scooter 0 2 2 20 
tractor 0 1 1 20 
subway 0 0 0 20 
wheelchair 1 2 3 17 * .33 .12 
tank 1 2 3 18 * .50 .11 
go-cart 0 1 1 20 
ambulance 0 0 0 20 
horse 5 0 5 12 * .63 0 
rocket 0 4 4 18 0 .22 


























































































































Note. * indicates words where less than complete agreement 
coincides with the appearance of false positive errors; 
FN = False Negatives; FP = False Positives; RRE = 
Retrospective Report Errors; Q(FP) = probability of finding 
a false positive error for subjects that categorize the word 
as not a member of the category; 12.(FN) = probability of 
finding a false negative error for subjects that categorize 
the word as a members of the category. 
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Ten subjects from the definition condition in the 
furniture category were questioned about their conscious 
experiences when attempting to define the category. All 
subjects reported visualizing things that they had in their 
own homes, or in rooms in their houses. Nine of them tried 
to see what they had in common, or put them in groups. Only 
1 subject used the strategy of trying to rule things out, 
such as doors, walls or appliances, by finding something 
that distinguished them from furniture. 
Table 5 
Shows a Classification of Definitions given by 40 Subjects 
Furniture 
Classification of definitions f 
Mentions one or several uses 
(e.g., to sit on, to lay on) ..................... 20 
Gives positive or negative examples .............. 7 
Mentions places where found ...................... 10 
Refers to physical features 




Classification of definitions f 
Mentions one or several uses (e.g., getting 
from one place to another, transportation) ....... 18 
Gives positive or negative examples .............. 4 
Mentions places where used ....................... 3 
Refers to physical features (e.g., has a source 




The hypothesis that errors would decrease when subjects 
were asked to provide a definition before making the 
categorization decisions was not supported. In fact errors 
increased from the no-definition to the definition condition 
on both categories, but the increase was significant only 
for the vehicle category. 
My second hypothesis, that the error-RT correlation 
would decrease if subjects came up with a definition for the 
category, was not supported either. For both categories 
there was no significant change in the error-RT correlation. 
Hypothesis 3, that words would keep roughly the same 
relative RT ordering in definition and no-definition 
conditions, was supported. In fact, the correlation between 
words' RTs in both conditions (definition and no-definition) 
was as high as expected from two groups performing the same 
task. 
Hypothesis 4, that the magnitude of the error-RT 
correlation would be less when retrospective report errors 
were used instead of normative lax errors, was supported for 
the furniture category. In this case, the error-RT 
correlation decreased significantly when errors where 
obtained from the subjects own retrospective report. For 
the vehicle category, the observed decrease in the error-RT 
correlation was non-significant. 
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Both Hypothesis 1 and 2 were the relevant ones in terms 
of verifying the theory that the error-RT correlation was a 
result of changes in a presumed coding stage. Since both 
parallel experiments (one with each category) can be 
considered each one a replication of the other and both 
showed a similar and consistent pattern of results not 
supporting the predictions of the theory, the evidence is 
strong against the coding stage theory as an explanation of 
the error-RT correlation. It is true that there were some 
variables--mainly in the selection of words in the lists--
that could have been controlled better, such as word 
frequency, words that can be understood in more than one 
sense (e.g., chest), and combined words (e.g., bean bag, 
coffee table). But there is a low probability of those 
variables having introduced a systematic bias on both 
experiments. A more rigorous control over such variables 
might change the specific results but not the conclusions. 
Since Hypothesis 1 and 2 were not supported, explaining 
why Hypothesis 3 was supported is not straightforward. 
Among several possible explanations, it could be that people 
came up with a good agreed-upon definition, and were able to 
use it, so they produced the same RT distribution; or that 
people were not able to use the agreed-upon definition, 
reverting to whatever they normally do, and hence produced 
the same RT distribution as control subjects. A post-hoc 
explanation based on additional analyses performed will be 
offered. 
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Results from Hypothesis 4 are mixed. Both categories 
showed that using the subject's own error report produced a 
decrease in the error-RT correlation, but the change was 
significant only in the case of furniture. 
Results from the additional analyses show that when 
errors are statistically controlled for differences in 
categorization between individuals (strictly speaking, the 
agreement variable shows the number of subjects that agree 
with Battig and Montague's [1969] category norms, but since 
answers can only be yes or no, it also shows intersubject 
agreement), the error-RT correlation is significantly 
reduced for both categories. For vehicle the correlation is 
reduced from .37 to .25 (a new R2 of 6%). For furniture, 
the new error-RT correlation is .04. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that part of the error-RT 
correlation is not an effect of category fuzziness or an 
intrinsic property of the categorization process, but a 
result of accumulating data over subjects and thereby 
erroneously tapping on errors related to intersubject 
disagreement. 
What exactly is the new residuals variable? It might 
be that removing disagreement completely removes unclear or 
fuzzy cases, and that is why the error-RT correlation 
disappears. The fact is that those cases are not completely 
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removed; only disagreement related errors are. By referring 
to Table 4, we are able to show the exact way in which 
between subject disagreement increases the error count. For 
words which are category members, it should be expected for 
all errors produced to be false negative errors (subjects 
that answered no and later realized they made a mistake). 
But as can be seen in Table 4, almost always that there was 
lack of complete agreement, the total error count was 
increased due to the appearance of false positive errors 
(subjects that answered yes and later changed their minds). 
Not making the distinction between false positive and false 
negative errors, and adding them together as if they had the 
same weight is a mistake because--as can be seen again in 
Table 4--for words that are in the category norms, the 
probability of a false positive error was consistently 
greater than the probability of a false negative error. 
That is, if some group of subjects considered a given word 
in the list not to be a member of the category, the 
probability of some of those subjects producing false 
positive errors was consistently greater than the 
probability of false negative errors for those subjects that 
did consider the word to be a member of the category. This 
held true for 73% of the 33 words where lack of total 
agreement was found in the furniture category, and for 75% 
of the 20 words where subjects disagreed in the vehicle 
category. 
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The fact that even when intersubject disagreement was 
controlled the vehicle category still showed a slight but 
significant error-RT correlation, may be considered evidence 
that, at least for this category, the correlation is truly a 
product of category fuzziness or of the categorization 
process. But it should be noted that the magnitude of the 
effect was rather small (around 6%). 
Results were more dramatic for the furniture category, 
in which intersubject disagreement was even greater and 
accounted for all of the error-RT correlation. Since in 
this case there simply is no error-RT correlation, it can be 
argued that furniture is not a category in the same sense 
that vehicle is. Dr. Jack Yates (personal communication, 
November 10, 1994) has speculated that the furniture 
category is an ensemble. That is, it is more like an array 
than like a traditional category. Following this line of 
thought, items of furniture might be grouped together based 
not on common features, but on places where they can be 
found (i.e. certain rooms of houses and buildings). In fact 
the organizing factor may be the activities of people inside 
living spaces, or arrangements of the objects into an 
interrelated ensemble. 
The fact that almost all subjects came up with 
definitions based on functions or ways in which the category 
members are used, and that all 10 subjects that were asked 
about the process of getting a definition referred to using 
concrete experiences to construct a category definition, 
argues also for categories organized based on activities 
that people carry out, as opposed to common features 
(especially physical features). 
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Regarding the main question of whether the error-RT 
correlation was evidence of fuzziness in natural categories, 
the answer is that a great part, or maybe even all of the 
error-RT correlation is a result of aggregating data over 
subjects and incurring in the logical error of attributing 
properties of the group to the individuals that form that 
group. For furniture, the whole of the correlation can be 
explained by the lack of agreement between subjects, and for 
vehicle, the correlation left after the effect of lack of 
agreement was controlled, accounts for a mere 6% of the 
variance of categorization errors. These results do not 
support the predictions of dimensional theories (Hutchinson 
& Lockhead, 1977). Neither do they support a family 
resemblance explanation, where errors would be another 
manifestation of typicality. The theories that fare the 
worst in the light of these results are all theories that 
incorporate the error-RT correlation as a result of the 
categorization process. Among these are Smith et al.'s 
(1974) two stage model of feature comparison, Ratcliff and 
McKoon's (1988) Diffusion theory, and Hockley and Murdock's 
(1987) Decision theory. Theories that specifically address 
speed-accuracy trade-off and error-RT correlation based on a 
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guessing process--such as de Jong's (1991) pure guessing 
model, or King and Anderson's (1976) spreading activation 
theory--would also have to be revised in terms of the exact 
shape of guessing times distribution. 
These results as a whole can be explained in a post-hoc 
fashion by a two stage model similar to that of Smith et 
al.'s (1974) model, that does not predict the error-RT 
correlation. This model does not assume fuzziness as a 
basic phenomenon, but it assumes it is the result of task 
demands (e.g., amount of available information, speed 
emphasis) and of accumulating data across individuals. The 
first stage produces a positive response for any word, as 
long as the word can be placed in an underlying continuum. 
This continuum is relatively consistent across subjects, and 
manifests itself in several ways, such as reaction times, 
and typicality ratings. It is based on sensory-perceptual 
clues, which for some categories will result in an 
unidimensional arrangement. For example, in the case of the 
vehicle category the dimension might be being moved (either 
and image of being moved in something, or maybe even a 
kinesthetic sensation). In this respect, it is interesting 
to note that for this category the non-member word that 
produced the most errors was swing. Other categories may be 
structured not based on a unidimensional arrangement, but 
based on an ensemble-type grouping. Such might be the case 
for furniture, and maybe other categories such as tools and 
90 
parts of the body. As long as a word can be included in the 
continuum, the answer from this first stage will be 
positive, and the word will be available for the second 
stage. If it cannot be placed, the answer is negative and 
no second stage is necessary. 
The second stage takes words made available from the 
first stage and contrasts them with explicit criteria (maybe 
one or more features) in order to produce a yes or no 
answer. This second stage is very task sensitive, both in 
its occurrence and exact nature. Changes in its nature can 
account for hedges. This would occur by moving the limits 
set by the second stage within the bounds of the underlying 
arrangement. These limits are set by what the subject 
believes to be the nature of the task that he or she is 
being asked to perform. When we ask people to come up with 
a definition, in part what we are doing is explicitly 
setting the limits. Errors are also a result of this second 
stage, since it is assumed that subjects judge their initial 
stage productions by their current definition of the task. 
Under speed emphasis conditions what subjects would do 
is to alter the occurrence of the second stage. This causes 
answers to be sometimes based on a first stage response, 
which is always positive for words that can be included in 
the underlying continuum, producing a high proportion of 
false positive errors once the subject is able to judge his 
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or her response based on the situation definition. I assume 
that the source of false negative errors is a different one. 
The question of whether subjects were really able to 
use their definition or merely reverted to whatever they 
normally do is complex and cannot receive a clear solution 
from the data of the present study. If subjects did not use 
their definition, then the increase in errors that resulted 
would have to be explained as interference generated on the 
normal process by the subjects' attempts to successfully use 
their definition. If subjects did use their definition, the 
increase of errors can be explained within the model that I 
have been presenting. In the model, the subject's 
definition can act at both stages. Since the first stage is 
based on experience and difficult to make completely 
explicit, there is part of the definition that provides a 
category or categories similar enough (if they can be found) 
to produce similar results to the ones from the defined 
category. In the present study, defining a vehicle as a 
means of transportation is providing a nearly synonymous 
category, not a true definition. The same happens with 
defining furniture as things used to sit on, lay on, or put 
things on, only that in this case several categories, 
instead of a single one, have been provided. If the 
definition provides other elements, such as places where the 
objects are found or used, or physical features, these 
elements will act at the second stage, generally by 
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providing more restrictive limits to judge category 
membership. If this is true, then it should be found that 
the increase in average number of errors when a definition 
is used can be accounted for by an increase in false 
positive errors, since using restrictive criteria in the 
second stage will produce more reversals of first stage 
decisions. If subjects produce more decisions based only on 
the first stage as a way of staying within the bounds of the 
speed requirements, their subsequent judgements based on 
their situation definition once speed requirements are 
removed will result in more reversals, and therefore more 
false positive errors. On the other hand, if using a 
definition increases errors because of interference, then 
all types of errors should increase equally. 
On closing, I want to note that the methodological 
procedures devised for this thesis, such as using the 
subject's own error report, controlling for intersubject 
disagreement, and distinguishing between false positive and 
false negative errors, can be used to see if there are other 
categories where the error-RT correlation is really a 
psychological phenomenon attributable to fuzziness or to the 
categorization process. If other categories do show an 
error-RT correlation not attributable to intersubject 
disagreement, and the present results prove to be 
replicable, then there would be reasons to argue that maybe 
more than one theory of concepts is necessary. 
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'purpose is to present list of words for semantic verification 
'version 1.4 
'09/29/94 
'copyright Andrew R. Gilpin, Dept. of Psychology, University of 
'Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0505 
I 
'incorporates timing routines from: 
'Graves, R. & Bradley, R. (1987). Millisecond interval timer and auditory 
' reaction time programs for the IBM PC. Behavior Research Methods, 
' Instruments, & Computers, 19(1), 30-35. 
'and 
'Graves, R., & Bradley, R. (1988). More on millisecond timing and 
' tachistoscope applications for the IBM PC. Behavior Research Methods, 
' Instruments, & Computers, 20(4), 408-412. 
I 
DEFINT A-Z 
DECLARE FUNCTION TIME& () 
DECLARE SUB delay (STARTTIME&, DELAYDURATION&) 
DIM stimulus$(3, 63) 
'first index: 
' 1 for stimulus text 
' 2 contains m if member, n if not 
' 3 contains original sequence number before randomization 
'second index: 
' 1-63 representing target words 
DIM results!(4, 63) 
'first index: 
' 1 for original sequence number 
' 2 for correct response (1=yes, 0=no) 
' 3 for actual response " 
' 4 for rt in seconds 
'second index: 
' 1-63 representing target words 
DIM stopped%(63) 'set to 1 if previous trial was stopped 
'port for joystick buttons 
'value present when buttons not pressed 
'port for CGS video retrace 
CONST gameport% = &H201 
CONST gamemask% = 240 
CONST v% = &H3DA 
CONSTb%=8 'mask for vertical retrace signal 
CONST maxstimuli = 63 
CONST iti& = 1000 
CONST warn& = 1000 
CONST postwarn& = 500 
CONST feedback& = 3000 
'furniture members: 
'number of trials 
'intertrial interval (after feedback) msecs 
'duration of fixation stimulus in msecs 
'delay before stimulus, in msecs 
'duration of feedback stimulus in msecs 
DATA "chair", "couch", "rocking chair", "coffee table", "rocker" ,"desk" 
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DAT A "bed", "chest", "bookcase", "lounge", "cabinet", "stool", "piano" 
DAT A "lamp", "mirror", "television", "bar", "shelf", "bench" 
DAT A "closet", "fan", "clock", "end table", "bean bag", "rug" 
DATA "pillow", "wastebasket", "sewing machine", "personal computer" 
DAT A "drapes", "picture", "ashtray", "telephone", "refrigerator" 
DATA "sink", "counter", "stove", "cushion", "radio" 
'furniture nonmembers: 
DATA "grape", "pea", "nail", "rifle", "dove", "doll", "slacks", "strawberry" 
DAT A "spinach", "sandpaper", "cannon", "parakeet", "coat", "cantaloupe" 
DAT A "cucumber", "pliers", "bullet", "pigeon", "ball", "sweatshirt" 
DAT A "papaya", "screws", "arrow", "falcon" 
'vehicle members: 
DAT A "station wagon", "truck", "car", "bus", "motorcycle", "streetcar" 
DATA "cable car", "train", "rowboat", "airplane", "ship", "scooter", "tractor" 
DATA "subway", "wheelchair", "tank", "go-cart", "ambulance", "horse", "rocket" 
DAT A "bike", "van", "submarine", "jeep", "feet", "skis", "skates", "camel" 
DAT A "skateboard", "surfboard", "wheelbarrow", "stroller", "raft", "tricycle" 
DAT A "trailer", "yacht", "shoes", "elevator", "canoe" 
'vehicle nonmembers: 
DAT A "prunes", "potato", "hinge", "hatchet", "pumpkin", "mushroom" 
DATA "knife", "judo", "duck", "clay", "puzzle", "pajama", "cement", "brick" 
DAT A "ostrich", "bathrobe", "swing", "bracelet", "screwdriver", "tie" 
DAT A "baseball", "chalk", "glue", "belt" 
'sports members: 
DATA "football", "basketball", "softball", "handball", "boxing", "golf" 
DAT A "cricket", "fencing", "ice skating", "diving", "ping pong", "running" 
DAT A "hunting", "chess", "dancing", "sunbathing", "cards", "camping" 
DAT A "archery", "hiking", "jump rope", "badminton", "rugby", "hockey" 
DAT A "swimming", "horseshoes", "weight lifting", "horseback riding" 
'sports nonmembers: 
DAT A "glue", "stapler", "sword", "bomb", "albatross", "geese", "hula hoop" 
DATA "drum", "blouse", "slippers", "pencil", "gas", "bluejay", "dishes", "hairband" 
setup: 
CLS 
INPUT "Date (e.g., 09/06/94 for Sept. 6, 1994)"; today$ 
OPEN "com2:9600,o,7,1" FOR RANDOM AS #2 'open channel to terminal 
INPUT "Enter subject id (1-10000)"; subno% 
PRINT "Categories are furniture, vehicle, & sports" 
INPUT "Enter <F>, <V>, or <S>"; categ$ 
categ$ = UCASE$(categ$) 
RANDOMIZE subno% 'use subject number to reset random numbers 
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PRINT "Type average RT (msecs) from training, then <Enter>," 
PRINT" or just press <Enter> to use 600 msecs. as criterion." 
average$ = "" 
INPUT "Average RT"; average$ 
IF average$ = "" THEN 
average$ = "600" 
END IF 
average# = VAL(average$) / 1000 
PRINT "Initializing ... " 
FOR i = 1 TO 63 'initialize values 
stoppedo/o(i) = O 
FORj = 1 TO 4 
results!U, i) = -1 ! 'initialize results values to -1 
NEXTj 
NEXTi 
letter$= LEFT$(categ$, 1) 
SELECT CASE letter$ 
CASE "F" 
mymax%= 63 
category$ = "Furniture" 
'read in stimuli 
RESTORE 
FOR i = 1 TO 39 
READ stimulus$(1, i) . 
stimulus$(2, i) = "m"'members 
stimulus$(3, i) = STR$(i) 
NEXTi 
FOR i = 40 TO 63 
READ stimulus$(1, i) 
stimulus$(2, i) = "n"'nonmembers 




category$ = "Vehicle" 
'read in stimuli 
RESTORE 
FOR i = 1 TO 63 'skip over furniture 
READ dummy$ 
NEXTi 
FOR i = 1 TO 39 
READ stimulus$(1, i) 
stimulus$(2, i) = "m" 
stimulus$(3, i) = STR$(i) 
NEXTi 
FOR i = 40 TO 63 
READ stimulus$(1, i) 
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stimulus$(2, i) = "n" 





'read in stimuli 
RESTORE 
FOR i = 1 TO 126 'skip over furniture & vehicle 
READ dummy$ 
NEXTi 
FOR i = 1 TO 28 
READ stimulus$(1, i) 
stimulus$(2, i) = "m" 
stimulus$(3, i) = STR$(i) 
NEXTi 
FOR i = 29 TO 43 
READ stimulus$(1, i) 
stimulus$(2, i) = "n" 
stimulus$(3, i) = STR$(i) 
NEXTi 
END SELECT 
'now permute the stimuli 
LOCATE 10, 1, 0 
PRINT "--------------------" '20 slots for progress gauge 
LOCATE 10, 1, 0 
FOR i = 1 TO 2000 
11 = O 
DO UNTIL 11 > 0 AND 11 <= mymax% 
11 = INT(RND(1) * 100) 
LOOP 
12 =0 
DO UNTIL 12 > O AND 12 <= mymax% AND 12 <> 11 
12 = INT(RND(1) * 100) 
LOOP 
SWAP stimulus$(1, 11), stimulus$(1, 12) 
SWAP stimulus$(2, 11), stimulus$(2, 12) 
SWAP stimulus$(3, 11), stimulus$(3, 12) 
IF INT(i / 100) = i / 100 THEN PRINT "*"; 'update gauge 
NEXTi 
PRINT 
'set up timing routine 
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CALL timerset 
'initialize flag for abort 
abort%= o 
'display introductory information 
SCREEN 0,, 1, 1 
WIDTH40 
PRINT "Experimenter: press any key" 
PRINT " when ready to start ... " 
WHILE INKEY$ = '"': WEND 
main loop: 
ntrials = mymax% 
FOR trial = 1 TO mymax% 
mytrial = trial 
'check for abort 




proceed: 'location to restart if desired after abort 
'start iti 
itistart& = TIME 
'print stimulus on p. 3 while displaying p. 1 
SCREEN 0, , 3, 1 
WIDTH 40 
CLS 
stimlen% = INT(LEN(stimulus$(1, trial))/ 2) 
LOCATE 12, 20 - stimlen, 0 
PRINT stimulus$(1, trial) 
'construct ready message on p. 2 
SCREEN 0, , 2, 1 
WIDTH 40 
CLS 
LOCATE 12, 17, 0 
PRINT"-------" 
SCREEN 0,, 1, 1 
PRINT #2, "ITI before trial number"; trial; CHR$(10) 'post to terminal 
'complete iti 
itinow& = TIME 
itileft& = iti& - (itinow& - itistart&) 
delay itinow&, itileft& 
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'start warning (fixation) screen 
PRINT #2," Presenting warning ... "; CHR$(10) 
BEEP 
WAITv, b, b 
WAITv, b 
CALL scrn(2) 
warnstart& = TIME 
delay warnstart&, warn& 
'blank screen (p. 1) 




poststart& = TIME 
delay poststart&, postwarn& 
'present stimulus word 
'wait for vertical retrace, switch screens, get time 
PRINT #2, " Presenting stimulus: "; stimulus$(1, trial); CHR$(10) 
WAITv, b, b 
WAIT v, b 
CALL scrn(3) 
rtstart& = TIME 
'wait for a response 
WHILE INP(gameport) = gamemask: WEND 
'get time 
rtat& = TIME 
resp%= O 
DO UNTIL resp% = 224 OR resp%= 208 
resp%= INP(gameport) 
LOOP 
'calculate reaction time 
RT& = (rtat& - rtstart&) I 10# 
'switch to p. 4 for feedback 




IF stimulus$(2, trial)= "m" THEN 
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PRINT #2," (member)"; CHR$(10) 
ELSE 
PRINT #2," (nonmember)"; CHR$(10} 
END IF 
results!(1, trial) = VAL(stimulus$(3, trial)) 'original sequence number 
IF resp%= 224 THEN 'responded no (left button) 
results!(3, trial) = O 
IF stimulus$(2, trial)= "m" THEN 'error 
PRINT #2, " (incorrect "; 
results!(2, trial) = 1 
ELSE 
PRINT #2, " (correct "; 
results!(2, trial) = O 
END IF 
ELSE 'responded yes (right button) 
results!(3, trial) = 1 
IF stimulus$(2, trial)= "n" THEN 'error 
PRINT #2, " (incorrect "; 
results!(2, trial) = O 
ELSE 
PRINT #2, " (correct "; 
results!(2, trial) = 1 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
rtwas# = RT&/ 1000! 
PRINT #2, "response)"; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, " Reaction time (secs.)="; 
PRINT #2, USING "####.###"; rtwas# 
PRINT #2, CHR$(10) 
results!(4, trial) = rtwas# 
LOCATE 12, 3, O 
IF rtwas# >= average# THEN 'too slow 
PRINT II TOO SLOW: "; 
ELSE 
PRINT "YOUR SPEED WAS O.K.: "; 
END IF 
PRINT USING "###.###"; rtwas#; 
PRINT II SECS." 
'present feedback for feedback& msecs 
fbstart& = TIME 
delay fbstart&, feedback& 
'switch to p. 1 




'inform S of end of problems and wait for keypress 
SCREEN 0,, 1, 1 
CLS 
PRINT "Please wait for instructions." 
IF abort%<> 1 THEN GOTO results 'skip over abort stuff as data complete 
stopped%(trial - 1) = 1 'store flag indicating previous trial was stopped 
'on televideo, prompt for response 
FOR i = 1 TO 20 
PRINT #2, ""; CHR$(1 0)'clear screen 
NEXTi 
PRINT #2, "Press <spacebar> to print results;"; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, "press <Enter> to resume with trial "; trial; ";"; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, "press <Esc> to abort this run."; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, "Indicate your choice ... "; CHR$(10) 
choice$="" 
DO UNTIL choice$ <> 1111 
choice$ = INKEY$ 
LOOP 
IF choice$= CHR$(13) THEN 
CLS 
trial = mytrial 
GOTO proceed 
ENDIF 
IF choice$= CHR$(27) THEN CLOSE: END 
results: 
PRINT #2, "Make sure printer is on and press <Enter> ... "; CHR$(10) 
WHILE INKEY$ = "": WEND 
'output results to printer 
PRINT #2, "Printing results ... "; CHR$(10) 
FOR copy% = 1 TO 2 
averagesum# = 0! 
validresp% = 0 
LPRINT "Program Sergio output" 
IF copy%= 1 THEN 
LPRINT "Experimenter's Form" 
ELSE 
LPRINT "Subject's Form" 
END IF 
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LPRINT "DATE:"; today$ 
LPRINT "Subject:"; subno% 
LPRINT "RT criterion:"; average# 
LPRINT 
SELECT CASE categ$ 
CASE "F" 
LPRINT "Category: Furniture" 
CASE "V" 
LPRINT "Category: Vehicle" 
CASE "S" 
LPRINT "Category: Sports" 
END SELECT 
LPRINT '"' 
'LPRINT" (response code: 1='yes', 0='no'}." 
IF copy% = 1 THEN 
LPRINT" # Stimulus You Usually", "Response", "RT(secs};" 
ELSE 
LPRINT " # Stimulus You Usually" 
END IF 
LPRINT 1111 
FOR i = 1 TO mymax% 
LPRINT USING"##"; i; 'trial number 
LPRINT stimulus$(1, i}; 'stimulus on this trial 
DO UNTIL LPOS(1} >= 30 'pad stimulus field with periods 
LPRINT "."; 
LOOP 
IF copy%= 2 THEN 
LPRINT" __ ..... 
ELSE 
LPRINT "_ ...... _", 'blank 








'LPRINT results!(3, i}, 'actual response 
LPRINT USING "###.###"; results!(4, i}; 'reaction time 




IF results!(3, i} = 0 OR results!(3, i} = 1 THEN 'valid 
validresp% = validresp% + 1 




END IF 'copy% 
LPRINT "" 'for doublespace 
NEXTi 
IF copy%= 1 THEN 
meanrt# = averagesum# I validresp% 
LPRINT "Mean RT over"; validresp%; " valid trials:"; meanrt# 
END IF 
LPRINT "Comments:" 
LPRINT CHR$(12); 'form feed to clear sheet 
NEXT copy% 
'now write file 
PRINT #2, "Writing file ... "; CHR$(10) 
filename$= categ$ + MID$(STR$(subno%), 2) 
OPEN filename$ FOR OUTPUT AS #1 
FOR i = 1 TO mymax% 
'find the stimulus whose original order was i 
index= O 
FOR j = 1 TO mymax% 
IF results!(1, j) = i THEN 1his stimulus was the ith one in original list 
index= j 
j = mymax% 'force exit from loop 
END IF 
NEXTj 
IF index= O THEN 




'now write the results for stimulus index 
PRINT #1, USING "##"; index; 'first item is the trial number it was on 
PRINT #1, ","; 
'PRINT #1, USING "##"; results!(2, index); 'x item is correct response 
'PRINT #1, 11 , 11 ; 
PRINT #1, USING "##"; results!(3, index); 'second item is actual response 
PRINT #1, ","; 
PRINT #1, USING "###.###"; results!(4, index)'third item is reaction time in secs. 
PRINT #1, ","; 
PRINT #1, stimulus$(1, index)'last item is stimulus itself 
NEXTi 
PRINT #2, "Series completed."; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, "Results written to file"'; filename$;"'."; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, " "; CHR$(10) 
PRINT #2, "Insert formatted diskette in Drive A: and press <Enter> ... "; CHR$(10} 
SHELL "Copy" + filename$ + " a:" 
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SUB delay (STARTTIME&, DELAYDURATION&) 
ENDTIME& = STARTTIME& + (DELAYDURATION& * 10&) - 24& 




CONST d& = 32768 
CONSTe&= 51 
CONST f& = 1000 
CONST g& = 119318 
CONST h& = 35995906 
CONST I& = 28012 
CALL TMRREAD(hi, lo, rs) 
hi&= hi+ d& 
hi&= hi&* h& 
lo&= lo +d& 
lo& = (lo& • I&) \ e& 
rs&= rs+ d& 
rs& = (rs& • f &) \ g& 







INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFINITION GROUP. 
Definition production. 
(1) "We are going to start now, by asking you to give 
me a definition for******** This definition does not 
necessarily have to be brief, it can be as complex as you 
need it to be" 
(A sheet of paper and a pencil is handed to the 
subject) 
(2) "Please write your definition on this piece of 
paper. You will probably want to do it double space, so 
that its easy to add things if necessary" 
(Once the subject gets a preliminary definition) 
(3) "Now, read your definition, and think if there's 
any object that you would accept as a***********, that 
according to your definition should not be considered so" 
(If the subject finds an exception to his definition, 
then go to instruction #5; if not, then go to #4) 
(4) The experimenter must now choose between the 
following words, one that he considers appropriate, and use 
it to question the subject: 
For furniture, the experimenter will use the following 
list: 











I ? II 













I ? II 
(5) "Now that you have found an exception, please 
change your definition so to that this new case is taken 
into account" 
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(steps 3 through 5 can be repeated if judged necessary) 
(6) "Now, read your definition once again, and think if 
there's any object that you would ordinarily not accept as a 
********, but that according to your definition should be 
considered so" 
(If the subject finds an exception to his definition, 
then go to instruction #8; if not, then go to #7) 
(7) The experimenter must now choose between the 
following words, one that he considers appropriate, and use 
it to question the subject. 
For furniture, the experimenter will use the following 
list: 











I ? II 













I ? II 
(8) "Now that you have found an exception, please 
change your definition so to that this new case is taken 
into account" 
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(steps 6 through 8 can be repeated if judged necessary) 
(9) Once a mutually satisfactory definition has been 
obtained, the experimenter will say: "Please write down you 
definition, and read it out loud carefully. Later I will 
ask you to use it to decide if each word taken from a list 
belongs or not to that category as you have just defined 
it" 
(10) Once the subject has read the definition, the 
experimenter will repeat: "Remember that later I will ask 
you to use this definition to decide if each word taken from 
a list belongs or not to the********** category" 
Category verification. 
(1) "Now, you will have to decide if each one of 
several words that will be presented to you through the PC 
screen belongs or not to the********* category as you have 
defined it. This is a speed task, so you will have to be as 
fast as you can, even if that means making some errors" 
(The subject will now be shown the screen and the 
response switches) 
(2) "You will respond "yes" by pressing the right-hand 
switch, and "no" by pressing the left-hand switch. Please 
leave your fingers placed over the switches all through the 
task. Each trial will have the following format: 
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a) First there will be a line of seven dashes (signal 
the middle of the screen) that will warn you that a word is 
going to appear; 
b) Briefly after, the word will appear on the same spot 
that the dashes were; 
c) As fast as possible you will have to decide if it 
belongs or not to the category; 
d) If you notice that you made a mistake (either you 
pressed the "yes" switch and according to your definition it 
is not a*********, or you pressed the "no" switch and it 
really is a*********, then you have to say something out 
loud, such as: mistake, error, no, oops, sorry, etc. You 
have to use the same word all through the task. Choose and 
tell me now what word you are going to use; 
e) Almost immediately after your response, a feedback 
message regarding your speed will appear on the center of 
the screen. If you responded fast enough, the message will 
read: "YOUR SPEED WAS OK", and if you were slow in 
responding, the message will read: "TOO SLOW". You should 
try to get a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message as many times as 
possible. To the right side of the message, you will be 
able to see your actual response time for that trial 
expressed in seconds, so you will get messages as : "YOUR 
SPEED WAS O.K., .500 SECS", or "TOO SLOW, 1.2 SECS". This 
message will be available for three seconds, and then the 
cycle will start again" 
(3) "Remember that you have to try to get as many times 
as possible a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message, even though this 
may lead you to make some mistakes" 
(4) "Before doing the actual task, you will go through 
some practice trials in order to get used to the screen, the 
switches, and to regulate your speed. On these practice 
trials/ you will have to decide if the words presented on 
the screen belong or not to the sports category" (repeat 
form /) . 
(The experimenter leaves the subject in front of the 
screen, with his or her hands placed over the switches, and 
initiates the practice trials from the control room. If the 
subject is clearly slow--which means that he or she is 
having RTs of over one second--the experimenter will stop 
the practice after the 15th trial, and will tell the subject 
that he or she is being too slow, and will read again 
instruction #3) 
(Once the practice trials are finished, the 
experimenter will obtain the average RT for the subject. If 
it is lower than 600 msec., he will replace it as feedback 
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criterion for the experimental trials. After doing this, he 
will return to the subject's room) 
(5) "Did you have any problems?" 
(Any instructions that are still not clear will be 
repeated. If everything is clear, then follow with 
instruction #6) 
(6) "Now, you will have to do the same task, but 
deciding if each word that is presented to you belongs or 
not the********* category as defined by you. Read once 
again the definition that you made" 
(The definition is handed to the subject, and he or she 
is instructed to read it) 
(7) "Remember that all your decisions have to be based 
on this definition. Remember also that you have to try to 
get as many times as possible a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message, 
even though this may lead you to make some mistakes" 
(The experimenter leaves the room, starts the tape 
recorder, records subject number, and starts the program). 
Retrospective report. 
(Once the experimental trials are finished, the 
experimenter will stop the tape recorder, and will print out 
a copy of the subjects list of words, his or her actual 
responses, and the RTs for each decision. The experimenter 
will also print out a sheet with two identical columns with 
the target words in the same order that they were presented 
to the subject. The experimenter will take this list to the 
isolated room) 
(1) "I'll now ask you to go over each one of the words 
and categorize it as a member or a non-member according to 
the definition that you made (the definition is handed back 
to the subject). Rate your answers on a 1 to 10 scale, by 
putting a 10 besides each clear member, and a 1 besides each 
clear non-member according to your definition. If there's a 
case which is not clear to you, then use an intermediate 
number. You don't have now any time pressure, so be 
precise" 
(Once the subject is finished) 
(2) "The last thing that I'll ask you to do is to 
repeat the categorization but now trying to think on how 
people would usually call the object. You might find it 
useful to think that you are trying to be understood by 
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someone else; if so, would you call this an item of 
furniture? Rate your answers on a 1 to 10 scale, by putting 
a 10 besides each clear member, and a 1 besides each clear 
non-member. If there's a case which is not clear to you, 
then use an intermediate number. You don't have now any 
time pressure, so be precise" 
(Once the subject is done) 
(3) Do you have any commentaries or questions? 
(4) "Thank you for participating" 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NO-DEFINITION GROUP. 
Category verification. 
(1) "Now, you will have to decide if each one of 
several words that will be presented to you through the PC 
screen belongs or not to the******** category. This is a 
speed task, so you will have to be as fast as you can, even 
if that means making some errors" 
(The subject will now be shown the screen and the 
response switches) 
(2) "You will respond "yes" by pressing the right-hand 
switch, and "no" by pressing the left-hand switch. Please 
leave your fingers placed over the switches all through the 
task. Each trial will have the following format: 
a) First there will be a line of seven dashes (signal 
the middle of the screen) that will warn you that a word is 
going to appear; 
b) Briefly after, the word will appear on the same spot 
that the dashes were; 
c) As fast as possible you will have to decide if it 
belongs or not to the category; 
d) If you notice that you made a mistake (either you 
pressed the "yes" switch and it is not really a********, or 
you pressed the "no" switch and it really is a*********), 
then you have to say something out loud, such as: mistake, 
error, no, oops, sorry, etc. You have to use the same word 
all through the task. Choose now what word you are going to 
use; 
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e) Almost immediately after your response, a feedback 
message regarding your speed will appear on the center of 
the screen. If you responded fast enough, the message will 
read: "YOUR SPEED WAS OK", and if you were slow in 
responding, the message will read: "TOO SLOW". You should 
try to get a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message as many times as 
possible. To the right side of the message, you will be 
able to see your actual response time for that trial 
expressed in seconds, so you will get messages as : "YOUR 
SPEED WAS O.K., .500 SECS", or "TOO SLOW, 1.2 SECS". This 
message will be available for three seconds, and then the 
cycle will start again" 
(3) "Remember that you have to try to get as many times 
as possible a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message, even though this 
may lead you to make some mistakes" 
(4) "Before doing the actual task, you will go through 
some practice trials in order to get used to the screen, the 
switches, and to regulate your speed. On these practice 
trials/ you will have to decide if the words presented on 
the screen belong or not to the sports category" (repeat 
form /) . 
(The experimenter leaves the subject in front of the 
screen, with his or her hands placed over the switches, and 
initiates the practice trials from the control room. If the 
subject is clearly slow--which means that he or she is 
having RTs of over one second--the experimenter will stop 
the practice after the 15th trial, and will tell the subject 
that he or she is being too slow, and will read again 
instruction #3) 
(Once the practice trials are finished, the 
experimenter will obtain the average RT for the subject. If 
it is lower than 600 msec., he will replace it as feedback 
criterium for the experimental trials. After doing this, he 
will return to the subject's room) 
(5) "Did you have any problems?" 
(Any instructions that are still not clear will be 
repeated. If everything is clear, then follow with 
instruction #6) 
(6) "Now, you will have to do the same task, but 
deciding if each word that is presented to you belongs or 
not the******** category (if the subject asks what is 
********, he/she will be told that whatever he/she 
ordinarily think is a*********). 
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(7) "Remember also that you have to try to get as many 
times as possible a "YOUR SPEED WAS OK" message, even though 
this may lead you to make some mistakes" 
(The experimenter leaves the room, starts the tape 
recorder, records subject number, and starts the program) 
Retrospective report. 
(Once the subject is finished, the experimenter prints 
out the subject's responses, and takes the print-out to the 
subjects room) 
(1) "Here is a print-out with all the words that you 
saw, in the same order, and your responses. I'll now ask 
you to go over each one of your responses and put a 
checkmark besides any one of those that you now consider to 
be an error. You don't have now any time pressure, so be 
precise" 
(2) "Do you have any questions or commentaries?" 
(3) "Thank you for participating". 
